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SUMMARY 
Bargaining power can be defined as the degree of 
influence one party has over another to force conces-
sions or to effect agreements on one's own terms. Such 
power can be divided into two types. Type I bargaining 
power refers to the advantages that can be offered to 
the opponent in return for accepting one's terms. Type 
II bargaining power refers to the unfavorable conse-
quences that can be forced upon the opponent for re-
fusing to accept the stated terms. The purpose of this 
~tudy was to determine means available to dairy bar-
gaining cooperatives to obtain bargaining power. Sev-
eral hypotheses were developed from economic and 
organization theory and from laboratory experiments 
on bargaining behavior. A personal-interview survey of 
10 dairy bargaining cooperatives in the North Central 
Region was conducted to obtain information to test 
these hypC!theses. 
A ranking of seven objectives by each of nine coop-
erative managers showed that maintaining a market 
for members' milk was generally ranked most impor-
tant, while increasing the size of the procurement area 
was generally ranked least important. 
The four remaining objectives-securing 100-per-
cent control of the milk produced in the pr~urement 
area, negotiating for the value of the services provided 
bottlers, maintaining good relations with bottlers and 
maintaining the past highest percentage of class I sales 
-were in general considered more important than in-
creasing the size of the procurement area, but less im-
portant than maintaining a market for members' milk. 
A regression equation was derived for each of the 
seven objectives. These equations revealed how the 
characteristics of the cooperatives and their markets in-
fluence the ranking of the seven objectives. 
At most, two variables were sufficient to explain 
at least 85 percent of the variance in the nine rankings 
of each objective. None of the attributes had a signifi-
cant effect on the ranking of one objective-increasing 
the size of the procurement area. 
Growth of handlers and handler mergers, large-
quantity buying by a single retail unit, and competition 
from handlers in other markets in response to different 
federal-order prices and to a desire to expand total 
market area were considered the major processing de-
velopments affecting the bargaining ability of the co-
operatives studied. 
The results of bargaining between bottlers and 
dairy cooperatives in nearby markets were also influ-
ential on the bargaining ability of the cooperatives 
studied. All managers interviewed believed they would 
be in a strong position to negotiate a higher premium 
if one or more nearby cooperatives had already ne-
gotiated a premium or an increase in premium. A suc-
cessful milk strike by a cooperative in .one market may 
be beneficial to cooperatives in other markets. 
The extent to which two or more dairy cooperatives 
are willing to cooperate with one another in adopting 
mutually beneficial policies has, in some cases, a signifi-
cant effect on their bargaining ability. By working to-
gether to keep prices in close alignment and by jointly 
agreeing not to ship milk into another market in which 
a cooperative is attempting to negotiate a higher price 
by withholding milk, each cooperative may be able to 
negotiate higher prices; thus, the members of all co-
operatives may benefit. 
Adoption of such advantageous and cooperative (in 
the game theory meaning of the word) strategies, how-
ever, seems hindered by (a) each cooperative's fear 
that neighboring cooperatives will not adopt them, (b) 
each cooperative's desire to become larger, (c) each 
cooperative's ignorance of the advantages of such co-
operation, or (d) each cooperative's felt need to serve 
its own members. Such cooperatives may be involved 
in what game theorists call a prisoners' dilemma game. 
Baumol argues that the prisoners' dilemma game is 
involved in the logic behind governmental control in 
a democratic society (3). It may be argued that fed-
eral milk-marketing orders. cooperative mergers and 
cooperative federations can be rationalized on the same 
grounds. 
Adoption of cooperative strategies (in the game 
theory sense) can be assured by a merger, since each 
cooperative involved in the merger loses its previous 
identity and falls under the same management. A fed-
eration will not necessarily result in the cooperation 
required. Nevertheless, it does provide an atmosphere 
in which cooperatives can become more aware of the 
merits of cooperation. It is for these reasons that dairy 
cooperative mergers and federations are sought. A 
merger reduces the number of alternative sources of 
milk to the cooperatives' handlers and thus contributes 
to dairy farmers' type II bargaining power. Through 
closer coordination of the activities of several dairy 
cooperatives by joint bargaining programs or by var-
ious oral agreements among the cooperatives concerned, 
a federation attempts to do the same. 
Most of the cooperatives studied had little trouble 
in securing recognition from their bargaining opponents. 
A positive relationship was found between recognition 
and volume per handler. 
All but one of the cooperatives interviewed required 
members to sign marketing agreements, but only four 
of these agreements contained breach of contract pen-
alty clauses. Major emphasis was placed on preventing 
breach of contract through such means as membership 
meetings, personal contacts with members and the pro-
vision of a number of services to members. 
The cooperatives studied offer several services to 
bottlers and, in this way, achieve type I bargaining 
power. Such services include producer check writing, 
bulk handling of milk, full-supply contracts, diversion 
of surplus milk, etc. Governmental regulations may 
serve as a substitute for a cooperative's type I bargain-
ing power by establishing different minimum prices 
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to be paid for different use-classes of milk and by pro-
viding a seasonal milk-pricing scheme. 
A comparison was made between the negotiated 
prices in each market in which 10 cooperatives studied 
were located and prices that bottlers in these markets 
would have had to pay to secure milk from an alter-
native source. This comparison indicated that the value 
to bottlers of securing milk from the local cooperative 
was, in all but one case, greater than each coopera-
tive's estimate of the value of services provided bottlers. 
A regression analysis revealed that the excess of dealers' 
buying prices over the sum of price at the alternative 
source plus transportation cost was, on the average, 
higher for those cooperatives which (a) placed a higher 
value on the services they provide bottlers, (b) were 
located further from the alternative source and (c) were 
guaranteed, through federal-order regulations, of receiv-
ing a price in excess of the price bottlers would have 
to pay to get milk from the alternative source, by enough 
to cover the estimated value of services provided bott-
lers. 
The desire of dairy cooperatives to use their type 
II bargaining power seems negatively related to the 
percentage of the cooperatives' volume that could be 
replaced from alternative sources and positively re-
lated to the cooperatives' capacity to process milk. 
Other factors suggested as requiring consideration be-
fore a milk strike is called were (a) the number of 
bottlers from which to withhold milk, (b) the char-
acteristics of these bottlers, ( c ) the effect of resulting 
public reaction, if any, (d) whether economic condi-
tions justify the cooperative's demands and (e) whether 
members will back the strike attempt. 
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Most of the cooperatives studied were aware of the 
location of alternative supplies of milk that would 
replace some or all of their members' milk. They did 
not, however, indicate a clear notion of what it would 
cost handlers to secure this milk. With the exception 
of those cooperatives normally shipping milk to deficit 
markets, most cooperatives studied listed only the pro-
cessing facilities of their own or of other cooperatives 
as alternative outlets for their milk. 
Farmers supplying milk to the Chicago and Detroit 
markets receive large premiums over federal-order 
prices-much larger premiums than producers in other 
markets studied receive. Two findings of this study 
help to explain the existence of these premiums. (a) 
At recent retail prices for fluid-milk products in Chi-
cago and Detroit, aggregate consumer demand for 
fluid-milk products is inelastic in these markets, and 
derived demand facing cooperatives is also inelastic. 
(b) Bottlers in Chicago and Detroit need the milk 
of their local cooperatives. This is not true for bottlers 
in other markets studied. For the other markets stud-
ied, there is more than enough surplus grade A milk 
available from alternative sources to replace the milk 
of the local cooperative if it withheld milk. Chicago and 
Detroit are such big markets, bottlers there would find 
it virtually impossible to satisfy their current levels of 
consumption from alternative sources if cooperatives 
serving those two markets withheld their milk. 
Most of the cooperatives studied attempted to seek 
legislation that may substitute for their type I and II 
bargaining power--e.g., higher federal-order prices or 
legislation discouraging the use of ungraded milk for 
fluid milk and fluid-milk products. 
An 
of 
Exploratory Econometric Study 
Dairy Bargaining Cooperatives1 
by George W. Ladd and Milton Hallberg 
Farmers are, individually, unable to influence the 
prices they receive for their products. The firms to 
which farmers sell their products, on the other hand, 
are frequently price-setters; i.e., are monopolistic or 
oligopolistic. Consequently there is widespread belief 
that the resulting weak market-power position of farmers 
is one of the principal factors in their farm marketing 
and income problems. Reflecting this belief is an in-
creasing interest in farmers' bargaining power as a tool 
to improve farmers' income positions. 
Several individual farm commodity groups-most 
notably in the milk, fruit and vegetable industries-
have established bargaining cooperatives. One of the 
most important of this type of cooperative is the dairy 
bargaining cooperative. A 1957 survey by the Farmer 
Cooperative Service of the United States Department 
of Agriculture indicated that about 207 associations 
bargained over the price of approximately 1.3 billion 
dollars worth of milk.2 A major objective of these or-
ganizations is price enhancement through negotiations 
with processors. 
In this manner, such organizations seek to improve 
the income position of farmers relative to that of non-
farmers. Thus, cooperative bargaining associations are 
considered a partial solution to the complex farm prob-
lem. Grade A milk bargaining cooperatives are the sub-
ject of this study. 
OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this study was to determine factors 
influencing bargaining power of grade A milk bargain-
ing cooperatives, to determine their objectives, to in-
vestigate various means at their disposal for achieving 
their objectives and the e.xtent to which these means 
are utilized in bargaining with fluid milk distributors. 
Economists may find the procedures used in this 
study useful in suggesting ways in which they can study 
bargaining. The results of this study may also be use-
1 Project 1458 of the Iowa Agricultural and Home Economic. Experiment 
Station. This bulletin is a contribution from the Iowa Agricultural and 
Home Economics Experiment Station as a collaborator under North Cen-
tral Re,o:ional cooperative research _ project NCM-26, "Chan!dllg Market 
Structure and Organization of the Midwest Dairy Industry." The author. 
are grateful to the cooperative managers who supplied information for this 
study. 
• McMillen, Wendell M. Data from cooperative study. (Private com-
munication.) 1963. 
ful in evaluating and in working out methods of im-
proving the performance of the dairy industry. 
This study will provide some of the information 
needed for a better understanding of the complex bar-
gaining process. The results from this and similar 
studies may ultimately pave the way for a more realis-
tic model that would provide refutable hypotheses and 
that could be used to predict the effect of changes in 
various structural and behavorial variables on the 
farmers' terms of trade. 
CONCEPTS AND MODELS 
The focus of attention of research on bargaining 
power to date has centered largely around questions of 
(a) the theoretical framework within which generaliza-
tions and predictions can be made, (b) the extent to 
which farmers or labor unions can secure higher prices 
through the process of collective bargaining and ( c ) 
the factors that affect bargaining power. We will con-
sider the first and third. The second is treated in Ladd 
(18) . 
Bargaining 
Bargaining power may be defined in terms of its 
component parts: "bargaining" and "power." Power 
may be defined simply as the influence one has over 
others. Bargaining is a slightly more complicated con-
cept. 
Two things are basic to a bargaining relationship: 
(a) a conflict of interest between the parties involved 
and (b) an attempt by each party to resolve the conflict 
as favorably as possible to himself. Almost every bar-
gaining relationship also involves a community of in-
terest. Fellner (9, p. 15) has pointed out that, in bar-
gaining situations, the behavior of each party depends 
on the expected reactions of other parties. 
Since a conflict of interest is postulated, bargaining 
may be viewed simply as the simultaneous effort by 
each party to the bargain to win the consent of the 
other(s). That is, each party is trying to resolve the 
conflict in a way favorable to himself. 
The outcome of the bargaining process depends on 
how much one or both parties to the bargain can be 
led to move from some preferred position toward a 
less preferred position (see 8, p. 81). The degree of 
influence that one party has over another to force such 
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concessions or the ability to effect agreements on onc's 
own terms we shall refer to as bargaining power. One's 
bargaining power will be greater the more favorable 
he can make it for his opponent to accept his offer or 
the more unfavorable he can make it for his opponent 
if this opponent refuses to accept and refuses to bargain 
further (18, p. 14). Chamberlain (8) has also defined 
bargaining power. One feature common to Chamberlain's 
definition and to our definition is their relativity. The 
more favorable one's own terms are to the opponent, the 
more bargaining power one has. Our preceding defini-
tion could be modified to read: Bargaining power is the 
degree of influence one party has over another to force 
concessions or the degree of ability to effect agreements 
on one's own desired terms. A difficulty with this defi-
nition is that one's desired terms are subject to varia-
tion during bargaining as one's aspiration level is af-
fected (10, 27). 
There are two different types of bargaining power. 
The first stems from advantages that can be offered 
to the opponent in return for accepting one's terms. 
Such advantages may be in the form of savings that 
can be offered the opponent or extra services that can 
be provided. This kind of bargaining power is called 
type I or "opponent-gain" power. 
The second type of bargaining power-type II or 
"opponent-pain" power-consists of the bargainer's 
ability to enforce unfavorable consequences upon the 
opponent if he refuses to accept the stated terms. To 
exercise this type of bargaining power, the bargainer 
must be able to subject the opponent to some added 
costs or losses for refusal to accept his terms. The 
higher the costs or the larger the losses that can be 
imposed on an opponent, the greater is one's bargaining 
power. 
Bargaining outcome is conditioned by the bargaining 
strategy used during the bargaining process. The ele-
ments of one's bargaining strategy have been outlined 
by Stevens (29, pp. 57-96). 
A. Information giving and seeking tactics: 1) repre-
senting one's own preferences-the satisfactions one as-
sociates with various outcomes of the negotiations, 2) 
attempts to discover the opponent's preferences. 
B. Persuasion: 1) attempts to alter the opponent's 
preferences, 2) attempts to influence the opponent's 
expectations about one's own negotiation or extra-ne-
gotiation environment. 
C. Coercion: 1) attempts to influence the oppo-
nent's expectations about one's intended course of ac-
tion, including one's accurate representation, misrepre-
sentation, and/or concealing of his own preferences, 
2) attempts to influence the preferences and courses 
of action of "third parties" who may affect the out-
come of the negotiations. 
The outcome of bargaining is dependent upon the 
bargaining power and strategy of the individua~ bar-
gainers. The individual's bargaining strategy wl~l. be 
conditioned by his bargaining power. The bargammg 
.outcome will in some cases affect one's bargaining 
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power. Hence, bargaining power, strategy and outcome 
may be interdependent; if so, a study of the bargaining 
process must focus on this interdependency as well as 
on the exogenous variables affecting each factor. 
Models 
Hicks (13), Zeuthen (35) and Pen (22) have pre-
sented theories of bargaining that offer insights into 
agricultural bargaining processes. Theories of bilaterally 
restricted competition-bilateral monopoly, bilateral du-
opoly, and the like-are also helpful in understanding 
bargaining. These theories are summarized in Fellner 
(9) and Siegel and Fouraker (27). Game theory also 
suggests relevant concepts and hypotheses. Reviews of 
game theory are provided by Bishop (4) and Luce and 
Raiffa (19). Unfortunately, none of these theories is 
sufficiently well developed to provide a basis for pre-
dicting the outcome of specific bargaining situations. 
A cooperative is a firm amenable to economic analy-
sis. Phillips (23) and Robotka (24) have discussed eco-
nomic theory of cooperatives. A cooperative is also 
an organization. Therefore, concepts and analyses from 
organization theory are relevant to a study of bargain-
ing cooperatives. Papandreau (21), March and Simon 
(20, 28) and Barnard (2) are useful references. A 
cooperative is a vertical extension of a group of inde-
pendent firms. Its goals and behavior are affected by 
group decisions and group support. Knowledge of group 
dynamics (7) and social interaction within a group 
(14) is therefore helpful to a complete understanding 
of cooperative behavior. The relevance of the various 
disciplines mentioned in this paragraph to agricultural 
bargaining cooperatives is discussed at length in Ladd 
(18) and in Hallberg (11). 
These analytical techniques usually ignore the pre-
sence of government or assume passive government. 
Such an assumption is inappropriate to a study of grade 
A milk bargaining cooperatives. Most of the grade A 
milk marketed in this country is purchased by bottlers 
subject to the provisions of federal milk-marketing or-
ders.3 The operation of federal milk-marketing orders 
is discussed in (30). Some states possess milk-control 
laws, but none of the north-central states do. Most 
states and large cities also have sanitary requirements 
which farmers must satisfy to be eligible to sell milk 
for fluid use. These requirements can restrict the flow 
of milk into a market. The ways in which legislation 
can affect the bargaining power of a cooperative are 
discussed in Ladd (18) and in Hallberg (11). 
Prisoners' dilemma game 
One game encountered in game theory seems es-
pecially relevant to a study of bargaining cooperatives, 
especially to relations between cooperatives and between 
members and nonmembers. This is the prisoners' di-
lemma game. An example of a payoff matrix for such 
• In this report, the terms bottler and handler are used interchangeably 
to denote a finn producing bottled or cartoned fluid milk and cream 
products from farm·produced milk and cream. 
Table I. Prisoners' dilemma game payoff matrix. 
Player A 
Cooperative 
strategy 
Cooperative strategy ............ (5, 5) 
Noncooperative strategy ......... (6,-4) 
Player B 
Noncooperative 
strategy 
(-4, 6) 
(-3,-3) 
a game is in table 1. The figures in parentheses repre·· 
sent payoffs to the two players. If player A selects his 
cooperative strategy and player B selects his noncoopera-
tive strategy, A receives -4, and B receives 6. The terms 
cooperative and noncooperative are used here in the 
game theory meaning. Each player's cooperative strate-
gy requires some act on his part to cooperate with his 
opponent. 
This is a noncooperative game; there is no provision 
for collusion, communication or side payments from 
one player to the other after each play of the game. 
The sum of the payoffs to the two players is greatest 
if each selects his cooperative strategy and least if each 
adopts his noncooperative strategy. But each player has 
a strong incentive to adopt his noncooperative strategy. 
Given the strategy of the opponent, each player can 
increase his winnings by selecting his own noncoopera-
tive strategy. Theoretical evidence and experimental 
evidence show that both players select their noncoopera-
tive strategies in such games. 
If provision for side payments or collusion were 
made and enforced, this would not be a prisoners' di-
lemma game. Then each player would have an incen-
tive to adopt his cooperative strategy. 
There are pressures that encourage some coopera-
tives to adopt noncooperative or retaliatory strategies. 
If every cooperative involved can be better off if all 
adopt cooperative strategies, the cooperatives may be 
involved in a prisoners' dilemma game. Each player 
knows he will be better off if all choose a cooperative 
strategy; however, no player sees anything to be gained 
by adopting a cooperative strategy unless there is a 
guarantee that each will adopt a cooperative strategy. 
In games of this nature, cooperation may be achieved 
-if outside forces encourage it. Baumol, for example, 
argues that the prisoners' dilemma game is involved in 
the logic behind governmental control in a democratic 
society. That is, anti-inflationary measures, rationing, 
conscription, etc., " ... are designed, at least in part, 
to achieve the cooperation which alone can prevent 
the loss to each player from his trying to protect him-
self when he has no assurance that others will behave 
as .required for their mutual interest" (3, p. 362). 
The relevance of the prisoners' dilemma game to 
bargaining cooperatives will be discussed in the sub-
sections entitled, "Influence of Nearby Markets" and 
"Mergers and Federations." 
Price discrimination 
Federal milk-marketing orders provide for pricing 
milk at the farm level according to the use made of 
the milk. Higher prices are paid for milk going into 
fluid-milk (bottled milk and cream, half-and-half, cof-
fee cream, etc.) products for which demand is less 
price elastic. Lower prices are paid for milk used in 
other products for which demand is more price elastic. 
The price-discrimination model of revenue maximi-
zation relevant to a pure-bargaining grade A coopera-
tive which does not restrict supply can be formulated 
as follows. Let 
P, = price received by the cooperative for 
milk used in fluid milk products 
P2 = price received by the cooperative for 
other milk 
X, = quantity of fluid milk sold 
X 2 = quantity of surplus milk sold 
X = Xl + X 2 
Xu = fixed quantity of milk which the coopera-
tive must market 
C(X) = Xg(X) = cooperative's aggregate total 
cost function for X 
PI = fl(X I ) = milk dealer's demand function 
for Xl 
R] (X,) = Xlf, (Xl) = milk dealer's total expendi-
ture function for Xl 
1'2 = f2 (X2 ) = milk dealer's demand function 
for X 2 
R2 (X2 ) = X 2L (X2 ) = milk dealer's total expendi-
ture function for X 2 
(1) 71' = R,(X1 ) + R,(X2 ) -C(X) = net revenue 
But we have a restriction on the profit equation-the 
total quantity of milk produced by cooperative mem-
bers must be sold; i.e., X o = Xl -I- X 2 • Thus, the equa-
tion to be maximized is 
(2) 71'0 = RI(X, ) + R 2 (X2 ) - C(X) -
,\(Xo - X I - X 2 ) 
where ,\ is a Lagrangian multiplier. The first-order con-
ditions that 7r be a maximum are: 
(3) 07l'%X, = R/(XI ) - C'(X) -I- ,\ = 
f, (Xl) + Xlf/(XI ) - g(X) - Xg'(X) -I- ,\ = 0 
(4) 07r% X 2 = R 2'(X2 ) -C'(X) +,\ = 
f2 (X2 ) + X 2f2'(X2 ) -g(X) -Xg'(X) +,\ = 0 
(5) 071'%'\ = Xo - X, -oX. = 0, 
and the second-order condition is that the sum of the 
slopes of the marginal revenue curves be negative; i.e., 
R,"(XI ) -I- R/'(X2 ) < O. The number of primes indi-
cates the order of the differentiation. 
On taking the total differential of equation 1 with 
respect to Xl and X 2, and substituting 07r/oXI =07l'/oX2 
= -,\ from equations 3 and 4 and substituting dXI -I-
dX2 = dXo from equation 5, we find d7r/dXo = -'\, 
the !;hadow price of additional milk. Further, on solving 
equa tions 3 to 5 simultaneously for the unknowns Xl, 
X 2 and ,\ in terms of the average revenue and cost 
fU"1r:tions and their slopes, we have: 
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(6) Xl = [f2 (X2 ) -fl(Xl) + Xofl(X2)]</> 
(7) X2 = [fl(Xl ) -f2(X2) + Xofl(Xl )]</> 
(8) '" = g(X) + Xo((X) - [fl (Xl )fl(X2) + 
f2(X2)f/(Xl ) + fl'(Xl )fl(X2 )XO]</> 
where 
</> = [f/(Xl) + fl(X2) ]-1. 
Since d1T/dXo = -,\, if '" < 0, increasing Xo will in-
crease 1T, while if '" > 0, increasing Xo will decrease '11". 
Solving equations 3 and 4 simultaneously in terms 
of R/(Xl ) and Rl(X2 ), we find that the marginal 
revenue for Xl and X2 must be equal-the same result 
as for the unconstrained case. 
Further, since f/ (Xl) a.nd f2' (X2) will normally 
be negative and since fl (Xl), f2 (X2), Xl and X2 must 
be nonnegative to be economically meaningful, the con-
dition, 
(9) -Xofl(XI) :::::.. [fl(XI) -f2(X2 )] ~Xofl(X2)' 
must also be fulfilled. This condition is derived from 
equations 6 and 7 by specifying Xl :::::.. 0 and X2:::'" O. 
This condition states that, for example, if the monopo-
lists' average revenue from X2 (i.e., f2 (X2) ) is quite 
low compared with that from Xl so that the quantity 
within the brackets of equation 9 exceeds -Xof/(XI)' 
X2 will be negative. Hence, in our case, if nonnegative 
outputs are to be attained and the usual case of down-
ward sloping demand functions and positive prices pre-
vails, price discrimination will be possible if and only 
if the elasticities of demand in the two markets are un-
equal and equation 9 is fulfilled. 
Similar but more complicated results can be derived 
for the case where total output is not constrained. To 
our knowledge, a condition similar to 9 has not been 
rigorously treated in the literature on price discrimina-
tion. Rather, it is simply assumed that the profit-maxi-
mization solution will yield positive outputs and prices, 
and this assumption is, in general, not even made ex-
plicit. Harris (12, p. 52), however, has worked out sev-
eral examples which indicate that profitable price dis-
crimination is not always possible even if demand elas-
ticities are unequal in the two markets. 
The values of Xl and X 2 which maximize '11" subject 
to the restriction Xo = Xl + X 2 also maximize 1T!Xo; 
that is, solving the preceding problem is equivalent to 
maximizing '11" /XO. 
This model will be used in the section entitled 
"Type I Bargaining Power." 
Federal-order provisions 
Most of the 82 federal milk-market orders in effect 
have established only two use-classifications for milk: 
(a) class I milk which generally includes bottled prod-
ucts such as whole milk, flavored milk drinks, butter-
milk, concentrated milk and sweet and sour cream and 
(b) class II milk which includes all other milk products. 
The order then requires the establishment of minimum 
prices for each use-class. 
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The accepted standard for ~tablishing class I prices 
is that price which equates supply and demand in the 
market area. Two types of formulas have been devel-
oped to establish and maintain such prices. The "eco-
nomic formulas" relate fluid milk prices to selected 
economic factors (price and available supply of feed, 
per-capita disposable income, changes in the general 
level of wholesale prices, etc.), while the "manufactur-
ing milk formulas" relate the price of class I milk to 
market prices of manufactured dairy products or the 
value of milk used for such purposes. Specified differen-
tials are added to manufacturing values to account for 
the additional cost of producing milk inspected for fluid 
use and other special economic conditions that influence 
the price of milk in city markets. 
Several orders provide for the operation of an auto-
matic "supply-demand adjuster." The supply-demand 
adjuster is designed to correct prices for maladjustments 
in supply and demand in the local market. This device 
increases class I price when supplies of milk relative to 
class I sales are less than the "normal" or "standard" 
relationship of class I sales to supply. Prices for class 
II milk are determined by formulas based on manufac-
tured dairy products prices or on prices paid for milk 
by unregulated manufacturing plants. 
After the minimum class prices to be paid by bottlers 
are established, the prices to farmers are computed. In 
a market-wide pool, the total money value of all milk 
delivered to regulated bottlers by farmers is combined 
into one pool. Butterfat and producer location differen-
tial adjustments are computed. The blend price is com-
puted by dividing the value of this pool by the quantity 
of milk priced under the order. Each milk producer re-
ceives this blend price, minus his butterfat and loca-
tion differential. In an individual-handler pool, a blend 
price is computed for each bottler separately by di-
viding the total value of all milk delivered to the bottler 
by the quantity of milk delivered to the bottler. Each 
producer receives the blend price computed for his 
bottler minus butterfat and location differential. 
Many orders also contain one of three seasonal 
pricing provisions: seasonal class I price differential, 
base-excess plan or Louisville (take-out-pay-back) plan. 
See (30) for a fuller discussion of federal-order pre-
visions. 
Babb (1) and others (34) have used multiple regres-
sion to study intermarket blend price and class I price 
relationships for federal-order markets. Their dependent 
variable was market price; the independent variables 
were distance of the market from Eau Claire, Wiscon-
sin, and class I utilization in the market. They did not 
consider the possibility that price in each market may 
be related to the types of provisions in the federal-order 
in that market. To study the relation between federal-
order provisions and blend prices, we used the variables 
DI11 = 1 if market i has seasonal class differential 
= 0 otherwise; , 
DI12 = 1 if market i has a base-excess plan, 
= 0 otherwise; 
D ilS = 1 if market i has the Louisville plan, 
= 0 otherwise; 
= 1 if market has no seasonal incentive 
plan, 
= 0 otherwise; 
= 1 if market has an individual-handler 
pool, 
= 0 otherwise; 
= 1 if market i has a market-wide pool, 
= 0 otherwise; 
= 1 if market i has an economic-type basic 
price formula, 
= 0 otherwise; 
= 1 if market i has a manufacturing-type 
basic price formula, 
= 0 otherwise; 
= 1 if market i has a supply-demand adjust-
er, 
= 0 otherwise; 
= 1 if market i has no supply-demand ad-
juster, 
= 0 otherwise; 
Yi = average annual 1963 blend price in mar-
ket i in cents per hundredweight (31); 
Dli = 1 for all markets, 
Xl! = distance from Eau Claire to market 
(miles) ; 
X 21 = average annual 1963 class I utilization 
percentage (31); 
£1 = normally and independently distributed 
random variable with mean 0 and var-
iance u 2 ; 
= 1, 2, ... , 82 (the number of federal-order 
markets in 1963 being 82). 
The coefficients in the equation, 
(10) Y I = aODI + aUDuI + a12Du2 + al4Du4 
+ a22DI22 + a32DI32 + a4lD I41 
+ (f30Dl + f3llDill + f312D112 + f313D I13 
+ f321D121 + f331D ISl + f341D I41) Xli 
+ (yoDI + 'YUDill + Y12D I12 + YlSDlt3 
+ Y21D121 + Y31Disl + Y41D i41)X21 + flo 
can be used to study the effects of mileage, utilization 
and order provisions. High intercorre1ations among 
some of the independent variables necessitated the es-
timation of simpler equations. After eliminating variables 
with high intercorrelations - D I, Dill' D II2, D 141, 
D i12X lI , DIlSXlI, DI2IXU and Di31XU - the results in 
table 2 were obtained. 
There are 32 classes of federal-order markets. Re-
gression equation 10 can be written 
(11) Ylj = aj + f3 jX lii + yjX 2Ij + t:IJ 
Y IJ = price in i-th market in j-th class 
j = 1,2, ... , 32, 
Xllj = distance of i-th market in j-th class 
from Eau Claire, 
Table 2. Results of blend price regression analysis for 1963.' 
Coefficient Estimllte 
ali ............................................. -173.75· 
au ................. _ ................. " ....... 108.64*** 
al2 ............................................. 95.85** 
{Jo .......................................•..... 0.04576**· 
{J" ............................................. 0.04955*** 
{J" ............................................. 0.03792*** 
'Yo .......•.••..••.•.•••....•••••••.••..•..••.•. 5.042*** 
'Y" ............................................. -2.823 ** 
'Y12 .. • • . • • • • • • . • • . .• •...•..••••••••.•.•..•...• -2.398** 
'Yll ............................................. -2.537** 
'Y" ............................................. 1.237*** 
'Y" ............................................. 1.852**· 
'Y., ............................................. -0.466**· 
R' ............................................. 0.9985 
• A single asterisk, *, indicates significance lit the 10-percent level; 
**, the 5-percent level; .'., the I-percent level. 
X 2ij = percentage of class I utilization in i-th 
market in j-th class, 
aj = intercept for markets in j-th class of 
market, 
f3 j = effect of distance from Eau Claire on 
blend price in j-th class, 
Yi = effect of class I utilization on blend 
price in j-th class. 
Table 3 presents estimates of aj, f3J and YJ derived 
from the coefficients in table 2 for each class of market. 
Denote these estimates by aj, bj and Cj. (Throughout 
this report ah bJ and Cj denote estimates of al> f3j and 
Yi') The indexes s, t, u, v are defined as: 
s = 1 if DI11 1 
- 2 if DIl2 - 1 
- 3 if D lls - 1 
- 4 if DI14 1 
t= 1 if DI21 - 1 
2 if DI22 1 
u= 1 if Di31 - 1 
- 2 if DIS! - 1 
v= 1 if DUI - 1 
- 2 if DI42 - 1 
Thus, the first row in table 3 presents coefficients for 
markets with a seasonal class price differential, individ-
ual-handler pool, economic type basic price formula and 
a supply-demand adjuster. 
Some patterns can be found in these coefficients. If 
the pool plan, basic price formula and supply-demand 
adjuster provisions are fixed, 
attUY = a2tUY = a3tUY > ~tUY 
bltuv > b21uv = b31uv = b'luv 
Cuuv < CalUv < C21UV < C'tuv. 
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Table 3. Coefficients for estimating blend price in various classes 
of federal-order markets. 
Seasonal 
incentive Pool 
plan plan 
(5) (t) 
Class 
IiI 
I ...... I 
2 ...... I 
3 ...... 1 
4 ...... I 
5 ...... I 
6 ...... 1 
7 ...... I 
8 ...... 1 
9 ...... 2 
10 ...... 2 
II ...... 2 
12 ...... 2 
13 ...... 2 
14 ...... 2 
15 ...... 2 
16 ...... 2 
17 ...... 3 
18 ...... 3 
19 ...... 3 
20 ...... 3 
21 ...... 3 
22 ...... 3 
23 ...... 3 
24 ...... 3 
25 ..... .4 
26 ..... .4 
27 '" .' . .4 
28 ..... .4 
29 ..... .4 
30 ..... .4 
31 ..... .4 
32 ...... 4 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2 
2 
2 
2 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2 
2 
2 
2 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2 
2 
2 
2 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Bllsic Supply-
price demand 
formula IIdiu$ter 
(u) (v) 
I 
I 
2 
2 
I 
I 
2 
2 
I 
I 
2 
2 
I 
I 
2 
2 
I 
I 
2 
2 
I 
I 
2 
2 
I 
I 
2 
2 
I 
I 
2 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
I 
:1 
I 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
Estimates of pllrameters 
aj bj c; 
o 
o 
95.85 
95.85 
108.64 
108.64 
204.49 
204.49 
o 
o 
95.85 
95.85 
108.64 
108.64 
204.49 
204.49 
o 
o 
95.85 
95.85 
108.64 
108.64 
204.49 
204.49 
0.13323 
0.09531 
0.13323 
0.09531 
0.13323 
0.09531 
0.13323 
0.09531 
0.0831.8 
0.04571. 
0.08308 
0.04571. 
0.08368 
0.0457h 
0.0831.8 
0.04571. 
0.0831.8 
0.04571. 
0,0831.8 
0.04576 
0.0831.8 
0.04571. 
0.0831.8 
0.04576 
4.8413 
5.3077 
2.9892 
3.4551. 
3.1.041. 
4.0710 
1.7525 
2.2189 
5.21.63 
5.7327 
3.4142 
3.8806 
4.0296 
4.4960 
2.1775 
2.6439 
5.1270 
5.5934 
3.2749 
3.7413 
3.8903 
4.3567 
2.0382 
2.5046 
-173.75 0.08368 7.6643 
-173.75 0.04576 8.1307 
-77.90 0.08368 5.8122 
-77.90 0.04576 6.2781. 
-1.5.11 0.0831.8 6.4271. 
-1.5.11 0.04576 1..8940 
30.74 0.08308 4.5755 
30.74 0.04576 5.0419 
The last line says: For each combination of pool plan, 
basic price formula and supply-demand adjuster, Cj is 
smallest in markets having a seasonal class differential 
(cuuv), next smallest in markets with a Louisville plan 
(catuv), second largest III markets with a base-excess 
plan (C2tuV) and largest in markets, with no seasonal 
incentive plan (C4tuv). To compare CUllY with C2tIlY, com-
pare line L (L = 1,2, .",8) in. table 3 with line L + 8; 
to compare with C3tIlV, use line L + 16; to compare 
with C4tu\" compare line L + 24. 
Likewise, it is seen that 
aS1UV < a S2UV 
b.1llv = buuy 
C.IIlV > CS2UY 
Also we find that 
a.t1V < as t2Y 
battv = b.t2v 
C.tlv = Cs t2Y 
and that 
astul = a.tU2 
bStlll > bstu2 
Cstul < CstU2 . 
These comparisons hold three types of provisions 
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fixed and vary the other prOVlSlon. It is also possible 
to fix two provisions and vary the other two. 
These results indicate that different blend prices can 
be expected at markets located equal distances from the 
surplus milk producing area in Wisconsin and having 
equal class I utilization, depending upon the types of 
federal-order provisions. 
Hypotheses 
A thorough review of the literature in the areas 
mentioned in the section on "Models" yields a great 
number of hypotheses. No one study can cover more 
than a few of them. In this study, we concentrated on 
these issues: 
I. Recognition 
A. Ability of cooperatives to secure recognition 
from milk dealers as exclusive bargaining 
agent for the members 
B. Relation of recognition to volume of milk 
handled by cooperative 
1. Membership contracts 
2. Types of services offered to members to 
attract and hold members 
3. Mergers and federations as means of in-
creasing volume 
II. Type I bargaining power 
A. Services offered milk dealers 
B. Seeking favorable legislation and judicial de-
cisions 
III. Type II bargaining power 
A. Attitude toward milk strikes 
B. Alternative outlets for members' milk 
C. Demand for final products 
D. Alternative sources of milk for dealers 
COOPERATIVE STUDY PROCEDURE 
To study the issues just mentioned, managers of 10 
different bargaining cooperatives were interviewed in 
the spring of 1964; information was collected on the 
1963 operations of their cooperatives. The 10-page ques-
tionnaire used is presented in Hallberg (11). The man-
agers were encouraged to expand on any topics pecul-
iar to their individual situations that seemed relevant to 
the purpose of the study. 
The 10 cooperatives were not selected by random 
sampling. They are a judgment sample selected to as-
sure coverage of a wide range of operating conditions 
and bargaining results. We will interpret correlation 
and regression results as though we had a random 
sample. Although this may not be strictly valid, it seems 
better than treating them as purely descriptive statistics. 
Many of our inferences based on regression results are 
valid, however, if the data are taken as being generated 
by a "fixed X" or regression model. Johnston (15, ch. 
4) discusses the "fixed X" model. 
From these managers, information was collected on: 
1. size and location of milkshed, importance of co-
operative in the milkshed and in the retail market; 
2. mergers, consolidations or federations; 
3. services provided to members; 
4. information on market conditions collected by 
cooperatives; 
5. recent changes in the structure of retail and 
wholesale markets; 
6. principal outlets for cooperatives' milk, alterna-
tive outlets for milk, prices in each market and trans-
portation costs; 
7. handlers' alternative sources of milk and price 
differentials; 
8. services offered handlers; 
9. participation in legal or administrative proceed-
mgsi 
10. attitudes toward milk strike and 
11. objectives of the cooperative. 
CHARACTERISTICS AND MARKET ENVIRONMENT 
OF COOPERATIVES STUDIED 
The cooperatives studied are listed in table 4. 
Membership, as a percentage of total grade A pro-
ducers, and cooperative volume, as a percentage of total 
volume in the milkshed, vary considerably. This is due 
to variations in the importance of independent pro-
ducers and to variations in the amount of overlapping in 
the procurement areas. For example, there is consider-
able overlapping with cooperatives in eastern Iowa 
but practically no overlap in western Iowa. 
Table 4. Membership and volume of cooperatives studied, 1963. 
Cooperative Total 
Burlington Cooperative Milk Producers 
Association, Burlington, Iowa ........................ 14 
Cedar Valley Cooperative Milk 
Association, Waterloo, Iowa ........................ 320 
Des Moines Cooperative Milk Marketing 
Association, Des Moines, lowab •••••••• _ ••••• _ • • • • • • • 912 
Eastern Iowa Cooperative Dairy Producers 
Association. Cedar Rapids. lowab ....•.•.••..•••••••• 430 
Mississippi Valley Milk Producers 
Association. Moline, Illinois ......................... 540 
Nebraskll-Iowa Non-Stock Cooperative 
Milk Association, Oma~a, Nebraska ................ _. 1.489 
North Iowa Cooperative Milk Mllrketing 
Association, Mason City, Iowa ...................... 62 
Sioux City Milk Producer's Cooperative 
Association, Sioux City. Iowa ..... _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 
Pure Milk Association, C~icago. Illinois .................. 12,000 
Mic~igan Milk Producers Association 
Detroit, Mic~igan .............. ~ ...... _ ............ 11,917 
External Factors Affecting the Cooperative's 
Bargaining Ability 
Federal orders 
The seasonal incentive plans, pooling arrangements, 
basic price formulas and supply-demand adjustments in 
order provisions influence blend prices. These influences 
may affect the strategy cooperatives want to take in 
federal-order hearings and in determining what revisions 
to seek in federal-order price formulas. 
Federal orders may also be a substitute for a coopera-
tive's bargaining power. A cooperative that is unable- to 
negotiate a classified price plan with dealers can still 
operate under such a plan if it is in a federal-order mar-
ket. 
Some producers object to joining bargaining co-
operatives because of the deductions made to reimburse 
the cooperative for services rendered members. Under 
a federal order, all producers have deductions used to 
reimburse the market administrator or the cooperative 
for weighing, testing and sampling milk and providing 
market information. Since he pays for these services, 
whether a member or not, a producer under a federal 
order may be less reluctant to join a bargaining coopera-
tive. Thus, a federal order may have the side effect of 
increasing cooperative membership. 
Structural changes 
Table 5 lists recent structural changes which man-
agers believed had affected the bargaini~g power of 
their cooperatives. The ability of larger firms to survive 
Members~ip 
Percent 
of total 
producers 
in Brea l 
16 
54 
70 
55 
50 
97 
51 
100 
40 
79 
Annual volume of grade A milk 
Pounds Percent 
Total per of total 
pounds member in area' 
(000) (000) 
3,428 244.9 25 
125,000 390.6 54 
259,633 284.6 70 
135,589 315.3 55 
186,300 345.0 50 
486,900 327.8 95 
25,000 403.2 60 
66,929 398.4 100 
2,700,000 225.0 40 
2,898,496 243.2 57 
• The percentages reported ~ere are estimates provided by t~e respective cooperative managers. T~e exact numbers of grade A produc-
ers and volumes of grade A milk in these areas are unknown. 
b These two cooperatives ~ave recently merged but were in existence as individual cooperatives during 1963. 
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Table 5. Number of cooperative managers indicating their bar-
gaining ability was affected by various structural changes 
in the dairy industry. 
Structural change affecting the 
cooperlltives' bargaining IIbility 
Growth in size of bottlers and mergers 
Number of 
cooperatives 
of bottling firms ...................................... 8 
LlIrge-quantity buying by II single retail unit ............. 6 
Competition from bottlers in other markets 
due to different federal-order prices .................... 9 
Competition from bottlers in other mllrkets 
due to a desire to expand toto I market area ............. 9 
at lower prices, to initiate price wars and to sign up 
their own independent producers was believed to have 
a major impact on these cooperatives' bargaining ability. 
One cooperative had worked out an agreement with 
local bottlers whereby the cooperative would take on as 
members those farmers supplying milk to a firm being 
acquired by a local bottler (whether this firm being 
acquired was located within or beyond the cooperative's 
procurement area). This type of agreement may enable 
the cooperative to increase its control over the milk 
supply in its procurement area and to reduce average 
milk-hauling costs by reorganizing its pickup routes. 
Under such an arrangement, the local handler is spared 
the expense of picking up milk from producers previous-
ly supplying the acquired firm. 
Several managers believed that the development of 
large-quantity buying by a single retail unit had affected 
the bargaining power of their cooperatives. The size of 
some retail accounts has reached such proportions in 
recent years that the handler cannot afford to lose 
these accounts. The handler will typically contract with 
these outlets for a delivery date and price far in advance 
of negotiations with the cooperative. The handler is 
certain of the price he will get for his bottled milk and 
can use this as an argument for either paying no pre-
mium to the cooperative or for refusing to pay a higher 
premium. Thus, the cooperative's job of bargaining for 
a higher price is made much more difficult. Three of 
the four cooperatives who did not believe that this type 
of change had affected them were cooperatives in small 
markets where bottlers have few large retail outlets from 
which to secure such contracts. 
Competition from handlers in other markets may 
result in a lost market for the cooperative's fluid milk 
sales and in a reduction of the cooperative's ability to 
negotiate a premium. 
Influence of nearby markets 
Managers believed that they would be in a strong 
position to negotiate a premium or an increase in their 
premium if one or more nearby cooperatives had been 
able to negotiate a premium or an increase in premium. 
Managers thought they could use the gains won by a 
nearby cooperative as leverage against the local handlers. 
A successful strike may be beneficial to the coopera-
tive calling the strike and to cooperatives in nearby 
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markets as well. It can make bottlers in nearby markets 
aware of the possible results of a milk strike in their 
own markets and, therefore, less reluctant to negotiate 
with cooperatives. Using prices published by the U. S. 
Department of Agriculture (33) and the transportation 
cost function computed by Butz (6), we estimated the 
cost to handlers of obtaining milk from various alterna-
tive sources. This function is: transportation costs in 
cents per hundredweight = 3.4 + 0.16 X, where X is 
miles between markets. The bottlers served by each co-
operative studied could have obtained milk in 6 or more 
months of 1963 at a lower price than they paid the local 
cooperative. Hence, if a cooperative in one of these 10 
markets called a milk strike, his bottlers would probably 
be able to get milk from an alternative source for a net 
price no higher than the cooperative is presently getting. 
Unless prices are kept in line in the various markets, 
bottlers may secure milk from an alternative source, even 
if the cooperative does not call a milk strike. Thus, there 
is good reason for cooperatives to attempt to keep prices 
in line in two or more markets. 
Some of the managers interviewed attempt to work 
together to keep dealers' milk buying prices in line in 
different markets-largely through federated activities, 
as will be discussed in the section on "Mergers and Fed-
erations." Some cooperatives refuse to ship milk into 
markets in which another cooperative is attempting to 
gain a reasonable premium by withholding milk. 
However, this spirit of cooperation does not exist 
among all dairy cooperatives. In one instance, a coop-
erative withholding milk from a handler who refused 
to pay the cooperative's asking price was forced to lower 
its asking price since another cooperative agreed to ship 
milk to this handler at a lower price. In another case, a 
fluid-milk cooperative (call it A), not located in a fed-
eral-order market and not covered in this study, is al-
leged to charge handlers in its market a price consider-
ably below the federal-order price in two nearby federal-
order markets, thus making it nearly impossible for the 
two cooperatives (call them B and C) in these markets 
to negotiate a premium on class I milk. Cooperative A 
has refused to agree to an expansion of the federal-order 
market which would include its marketing area and 
which would facilitate the process of keeping prices in 
line in these three markets. Such actions on the part of 
nearby cooperatives such as A seriously restrict the 
effectiveness of cooperative bargaining activities of B 
and C. 
In such cases, the cooperatives may be involved in 
prisoners' dilemma games. It is possible that total receipts 
by members of cooperatives A, Band C would be higher 
if they cooperated with each other but that the mem-
bers of cooperative A would receive less by working 
with B and C. The gain to the members of B and C 
comes at the expense of the members of A. Possibly 
this could be converted into a cooperative game if pro-
visions could be made for arbitration or side payments; 
i.e., for assuring that A's members would share in the 
joint gain obtainable if A cooperates with Band C. 
State and local regulations 
Many state and local milk regulations tend to impede 
the interstate flow of milk and thus pose a limitation to 
the efficient geographic distribution of milk production 
(34). ' 
The effect of restrictive regulation in any market is 
to limit the number of potential sources of milk for 
bottlers located in the market. This tends to enhance 
the bargaining power of the cooperative whose members 
are regular suppliers to this market. It also tends to 
weaken the bargaining power of the cooperatives who 
might supply milk to the market in the absence of re-
strictive regulation. 
There are at least two instances in which this type 
of regulation affects the cooperatives in this stu~y. Be-
fore milk may be shipped into the city of Burlmgton, 
Iowa, the milk producer must receive a perm~t ~o do 
so and pay an inspection fee of $10 per year. SImIlarly, 
to ship milk into St. Louis, Missouri, an inspection. fee 
of 4 cents per hundredweight is required unless waIved 
by the local authorities. Such fee requirements do not 
absolutely prevent the shipment of milk into Burlington 
and St. Louis; but they mean an additional expense that 
may make these markets an uneconomic alternative out-
let and, hence, reduce a cooperative's bargaining power. 
Information Secured by Cooperatives 
Demand for milk and milk products 
Table 6 provides an indication of the extent .to which 
the managers interviewed attempt to keep mformed 
about the conditions of demand for milk and milk prod-
ucts. One manager listed only one of the 11 sources. and 
a second only four. The remaining eight managers lIsted 
at least six of the sources shown in table 6. 
Alternative sources of milk for handlers 
Every manager interviewed w~ quite a~are of ~he 
existence and location of alternatIve supphes of mIlk. 
Most of the cooperatives mentioned as alternative 
N umber of managers securing various types of informa-
tion on the demand for milk and milk products. 
Information secured 
Number of 
cooperotives 
Supply-demand adjustment in effect in ihe order ......... 3 
Sales to handlers ..................................... 8 
Reports from handlers ............ , .................... 7 
Price changes at retail ................................ 6 
Changes in other federal-order price formulas ............ 8 
Changes in CCC support purcheses of surplus products ... 6 
Changes in ecc support price level .................... 6 
University outlook information ......................... .4 
Success or failure of other cooperatives in 
negotieting with handlers .............................. 8 
Farm or trade publicatons ............................ .4 
sources of milk were located within the milkshed of 
federal-order markets. 
The cooperatives studied-with the exception of the 
Chicago and Detroit cooperatives-also were aware ~at 
their entire volume could easily be replaced by mIlk 
from these alternative sources. The amount of milk re-
ceived by bottlers in several federal-order markets in the 
North Central Region which was in excess of fluid milk 
or class I sales is shown in table 7. This milk, it is 
hypothesized, could have been used as class I milk in 
other markets.4 By comparing the total 1963 volume of 
the cooperatives studied (table 4) with the 1963 volu~e 
of surplus milk available from the markets (table 7), 1t 
is seen that there was sufficient milk to replace the en-
tire volume of any of the cooperatives studied except 
Chicago and Detroit. 
The Detroit cooperative controls practically all milk 
produced in Michigan through its own operations and 
through the operation of a federation of all Michigan 
. dairy cooperatives. Thus, Detroit bottlers would not be 
likely to secure milk from ~ny ot~er Mic~igan ~e~eral­
order market during a wlthholdmg actIon. SImIlarly 
Detroit bottlers would probably get no milk from Fort 
Wa}'ne or Toledo because of the existence of the Great 
Lakes Milk Marketing Federation. In addition, the 
• Thi. does not, of course, exhaust. the. entire supply 01 surpl.us. milk . th~ 
could have been used for class I mIlk In other lI!arkets, but It IS behe,,: 
to represent the major portion of the total since most of the mach lor! 
fluid milk markets are r"'l!ulated by federal orders even though mu 0 
the area in some states " not regulated by a federal order. Ade~uate 
data with which to estimate the total amount of surplus nulk available 
from unregulated markets i. not available. 
Table 7. Producer milk used for purposes other than class I by 
regulated handlers in several North Central federal-order 
markets, 1963.· 
Federal-order merket Pounds 
(0001 
Chicago ............................................ 3,596,662 
South Bend-LaPorte-Elkhart ..... ,..................... 52,460 
Rock River Valley. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . 26,292 
Milwaukee .......................................... 127,615 
Southern Michigan ................................... 1,527,003 
Muskegon 43,112 
Upstete Michigen ................................. . 26,772 
Michigan Upper Peninsula ............................ 33,266 
Northeastern Wisconsin ............................. 196,699 
Madison .......................................... . 
Quad Cities-Dubuque ............................... . 
Nebraska-Western Iowa ........... . ................ . 
Sioux City ................................... . 
Minneapolis-St. Paul ................................ . 
Duluth-Superior .................................... . 
Cedar Rapids-Iowa City ............................. . 
North-central Iowa .................................. . 
64,661 
92,658 
105,754 
19,154 
420,008 
69,049 
84,097 
38,083 
Des Moines ......................................... 78,806 
• Source: U. S. Dept. Agr. Federal milk order market stotistics, 
annual summary for 1963. U. S. Dept. Agr. Stat. Bul. 345. 1964. 
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Chicago cooperative would probably not supply milk to 
Detroit bottlers during an attempt by the Detroit coop-
erative to negotiate a premium. 
Chicago handlers are not likely to get milk from 
other cooperatives in Chicago, Michigan, Toledo or Fort 
Wayne during an attempt by the Chicago cooperative 
to negotiate a higher price for its milk. A federation of 
Chicago-area cooperatives exists. Since the Chicago 
cooperative controls about 40 percent of the total grade 
A milk production in its procurement area, which in-
cludes the entire market area of the Milwaukee, Rock 
River Valley and South Bend-LaPorte-Elkhart federal 
orders and about one-fourth of the Madison federal 
order, it may control as much as 125 million pounds of 
the surplus milk available from these latter four federal 
orders. 
Combining the remaining amount of surplus milk in 
these last four markets with that of the other federal-
order markets listed in table 7, we get slightly over 1.25 
billion pounds of surplus milk. Assuming 15 percent of 
this surplus milk is needed to meet (a) day-to-day fluc-
tuations in milk receipts, (b) seasonal fluctuations in 
milk receipts and (c) day-to-day fluctuations in sales of 
milk products, we are left with 1.06 billion pounds of 
surplus milk available to Chicago and Detroit handlers 
-enough to replace 39.3 percent of the Chicago coop-
erative's volume or 36.6 percent of the Detroit coopera-
tive's volume. As will be noted in the later subsection 
"Attitude Toward Striking," the amount of the mop-
erative's volume replaceable from alternative sources 
may be an important factor in the cooperative's d 'sire 
to call a milk strike. 
These figures may underestimate the amount of .. nilk 
that would be available to Chicago and Detroit bOI tIers 
if cooperatives supplying these markets withheld milk. 
In 1963, in the 13-state area covered by the 12 north-
central states plus Kentucky, 9.1 billion pounds of grade 
A milk were used in other than class I products in fed-
eral-order markets. From this figure, if we deduct the 
class II milk in the markets listed in the two preceding 
paragraphs and in the Northeastern Ohio order, which 
would not be available to Chicago and Detroit bottlers, 
and then deduct 15 percent of the remainder, we obtain 
3.4 billion pounds of milk. This represents the amount 
of milk that could have been available to Chicago and 
Detroit bottlers from all federal-order markets in the 
region other than the excluded ones. This figure is only 
about 25 percent greater than the annual volume of the 
Chicago cooperative, 20 percent greater than the annual 
volume of the Detroit cooperative and about 60 percent 
of their sum. It is evident that Detroit and Chicago 
bottlers would be hard pressed to find milk if the coop-
eratives in these markets called a milk strike. 
Farmers supplying these two markets receive sub-
stantial premiums over federal milk-marketing order 
prices-much larger premiums than farmers in other 
markets receive. These findings on the scarcity of alter-
native sources of milk for these two markets and the 
abundance of alternative sources of milk for other mar-
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kets do much to explain the differences In premiums 
among the markets. 
Alternative outlets for the cooperative's milk 
Only two of the cooperatives studied-Waterloo and 
Cedar Rapids-shipped a substantial volume of milk to 
fluid-milk markets in the South. Three other coopera-
tives shipped small amounts as requests came from coop-
eratives in other markets. 
The only alternative outlet for the cooperative's 
milk suggested by the remaining cooperative managers 
was the surplus milk processing facilities owned by the 
cooperative or owned by nearby cooperatives. Usually 
these were butter and nonfat dry milk processing plants. 
Evidently, if an alternative outlet was for some reason 
needed for milk now used in class I, most of the coop-
eratives studied would market this milk in lower-valued 
outlets other than class 1. 
Services for Members 
One way for a cooperative to develop membership 
support and loyalty is to provide other services to mem-
bers in addition to price negotiation. The data in table 
8 show the number of cooperatives studied that provide 
various services to members. The first three services con-
stitute the cooperative's price-bargaining activities. The 
other services are intended to expand the demand for 
the members' product, increase the efficiency of mem-
bers' production and provide resources used in the pro-
duction of milk at a discount. 
COOPERATIVE OBJECTIVES 
In this study, information was collected from each 
cooperative manager on the objectives of his cooperative 
and on the relative importance of each objective. Since 
the objectives of a firm are important in determining 
Table 8. Services provided members by the cooperatives studied. 
Service provided members 
Cooperatives 
providing 
the service 
Bargaining for the price of milk ........................ 10 
Bargaining for a service charge premium ................ 10 
Bargaining for a bulk tank premium ..................... 9 
Conduct quelity improvement work for use by members ... 10 
Conduct quality education programs for members ........ 10 
Conduct quality control and inspection programs ......... 10 
Test and weigh milk ............................. " ..... 9 
Help members achieve production efficiency ............ 7 
Stock and distribute milk production supplies ............. 10 
Assemble market information for use by members ......... 9 
Pick up and deliver milk ................................ 6 
Provide insurance policies for members .................. 8 
Provide credit for members ............................ 6 
Acquire and maintain facilities for handling surplus milk .... 9 
Engage in local promotional programs ................... 10 
Contribute money to the programs of the 
American Dairy Association ............................ 8 
Table 9. Importance of various objectives to nine dairy bargaining cooperatives studied. 
Cooperative rankings' Pooled 
2 3 4 5 6 7 B 9 ranking 
I-Negotiating a price that will give members 
the highest possible net return for milk ...... I 3 5 4 2.5 2.5 5 2 
2-Maintaining II market for members' milk ..... 2 1.5 2.5 2 3 2 
3-Maintaining past highest percentage 
of class I sales ............................ 5 2 3 3 2.5 4 3 4 4 3 
4-Securing 100-percent control of milk 
produced in procurement area ............. .4 4 4 6 5 7 6 I 6.5 5 
5-lncreasing the size of procurement area ..... 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 6.5 7 
6-Negotiating for the estimated value of 
services performed for handlers ............. 3 6 6 5 6 5 5 6 6 
7-Maintaining good relations with handlers ..... 6 5 1.5 2 2.5 2.5 4 2 5 4 
Rank correlation between cooperative rankings and 
pooled ranking b 
0.643 0.929 0.704 0.821 0.889 0.830 0.929 0.393 0.722 
• Tied rankings are each assigned the average of the ranks they would have been assigned had no ties occurred. 
b Spearman rank-correlation coefficient corrected for tied rankings. To be significant at the 5-percent level, this coefficient must equal or 
exceed 0.750 and, at the 10-percent level, 0.626 (see 16). 
its actions and since objectives can vary among firms, 
it would be useful to know if a firm's objectives are to 
some extent predictable. This question was also studied. 
From discussions with the managers of the coopera-
tives studied and with Cooperative Extension Service 
specialists who have worked with dairy bargaining coop-
eratives, a list of seven possible objectives of dairy bar-
gaining cooperatives was developed. Each manager was 
asked to rank each objective according to its importance 
to his cooperative, assigning a rank of 1 to the most 
important, 2 to the second most important, and so on. 
We carefully tried to include on the list every perceived 
objective of every manager interviewed. Whether we 
succeeded or not we do not know, but no manager 
suggested that we had left off an important objective. 
The objectives and their rankings are shown in table 9. 
(One manager did not rank the objectives.) 
The information in table 9 shows that dairy bargain-
ing cooperatives place greater importance on some ob-
jectives than on others. Evidently some of these coop-
eratives have a hierarchial goal system in which objec-
tives are ordered lexicographically (25, pp. 232-234). 
The manager of cooperative 2, for example, explained 
his ranking as follows: "Only if we have a market for 
our milk, can we hope to maintain our class I sales, and 
not until we are assured of a market for our class I sales, 
can we hope to bargain for the price of this milk. To 
support our bargaining ability, we need to control the 
supply of milk and to maintain good relations with 
handlers. Only after all these have been achieved will 
it benefit us to increase our volume." 
To test the null hypothesis that there is no agreement 
among the nine rankings of the objectives, Kendall's co-
efficient of concordance, W, is used (16). W provides 
a measure of the degree of association or agreement 
among a set of k > 2 rankings. Its range is from zero to 
unity; zero indicating no agreement among the k rank-
ings, and unity indicating perfect agreement. (If k = 2, 
then the Spearman rank-correlation coefficient can be 
used. It has a range of -1 to 1.) 
The computed W for the data in table 9 was 0.615, 
which is significantly different from zero at the I-per-
cent level. Thus, the null hypothesis of no agreement 
among these nine rankings must be rejected. There is 
reason to believe that the nine cooperative managers 
were applying essentially the same underlying standards 
in ranking these objectives. One estimate of this stand-
ard suggested by Kendall ( 16) is the pooled ranking 
obtained by ranking each objective according to the 
sum of the ranks assigned to it, the one with the smallest 
sum being ranked first. If, for two or more objectives, 
the sums are equal, we rank them according to the sum 
of squares of the individual ranks assigned to them, the 
one with the smaller sum of squares being ranked first. 
This pooled ranking is shown in the last column of table 
9. 
The correlations shown in the last row of table 9 
are the rank-correlation coefficients between each coop-
erative's ranking of the objectives and the pooled rank-
ing of the objectives. 
Different cooperatives may have different aspirations. 
Each cooperative's aspirations may be conditioned by 
various factors peculiar' to the individual cooperative. 
For example, the three managers giving the first objec-
tive the highest rank had sufficient processing facilities 
to handle at least 60 percent of their entire volume. The 
remaining six cooperatives could not handle this much 
of their milk in their own processing plant. 
This suggests the desirability of investigating the 
degree to which various physical and environmental at-
tributes of the cooperative may influence its ranking of 
these objectives. 
Multiple regression is one procedure for measuring 
this influence. It will (a) enable us to determine which 
characteristics were most important in explaining why 
the cooperatives ranked the seven objectives differently 
639 
and (b) provide a means of predicting how cooperatives 
will rank the objectives given a change in the level of 
one or more of their physical and environmental attrj~ 
butes. 
A separate analysis was conducted on each of the 
seven objectives. For each, the nine rankings of the ob~ 
jective was the dependent variable. Seventeen different 
attribute variables of the nine cooperatives were initially 
considered as possible candidates for independent var~ 
iables in each analysis. Attributes not significantly cor~ 
related with the dependent variable at the 30-percent 
confidence level were eliminated from further considera-
tion. 
The procedure used was to fit, by least squares, re-
gression equations of the form 
(12) Yjj = aj + l {3lkXkj 
k 
where YIj is the ranking of objective i (i = 1, 2, ... , 7) 
by cooperative j (j = 1, 2, ... , 9) and X kj is the value 
of X k for cooperative j, using different combinations of 
X k• If no independent variables were found to be signif-
icantly related to the dependent variable, the model 
was reduced to Y I = aj where 0:1 is simply an estimate 
of the mean of YI, YI. 
The Yij are numbered as in table 9: The Xkj are: 
Xl = percentage of the local bottlers with which 
the cooperative attempted to bargain in 1963 
who would bargain-i.e., the cooperative's 
ability to secure recognition as the exclusive 
bargaining agent, 
X 2 = average volume per bottler with which the 
cooperative bargained in 1963 in millions of 
pounds, 
Xs = bottler's buying price for 3.5-percent produc-
er milk for fluid use in 1963 in cents per 
hundredweight, 
Xo = percent of the cooperative's volume sold to 
class I outlets, 
X 10 = annual average 1963 negotiated premium on 
class I milk in cents per hundredweight, 
X 11 = number of class I bottlers who would bar-
gain with the cooperative in 1963, 
X13 = percentage of the cooperative's volume that 
could have been handled in the cooperative's 
own processing plant and 
X IO = approximate number of dairy cows per thou-
sand crop acres in the cooperative's procure-
ment area, 1962. 
Selected equations with standard errors of the estimates 
in parentheses are: 
Y1j = 0.00904 XSj - 0.03112 X18j 
(0.00138) (0.01085) 
R2 = 0.8755 
(13.1 ) 
( 13.2) Y2j = 0.09754 X2j R2 = 0.8506 
(0.01455) 
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(13.3 ) 
(13.4) 
(13.5 ) 
(13.6) 
(13.7) 
Y3j = 0.02777 X 9j + 0.03349 X1Sj 
(0.00928) (0.01390) 
R2 = 0.8934 
Y~j = -0.08377 X 2j + 0.08768 X Pj 
(0.06958) (0.01775 
R2 = 0.9102 
Yal = 6.83333 
(0.11785) 
YOj = 0.05410 Xlj 
(0.00374) 
R2 = 0.9976 
R2 = 0.9631 
Y7j = 2.01042 + 0.00722 X11j 
(0.23208) (0.00335 ) 
+ 0.02941 X 18j 
(0.00506) 
R2 = 0.9875 
The addition of X~ or X29 to equations 13.2 to 13.4 
yielded significant coefficients. These equations are 
(13.2a) Y2j = -0.289 X 2j + 0.0966 X Oj 
+ 0.0114 X~j - 0.000739 X;j 
R2 = 0.9808 
(13.3a) Yaj = 0.108 X Oj + 0.0182 X IOj 
-0.000939 X: j R2 =0.9417 
(13.4a) Y4j = -0.193 X 2j + 0.225 X Pj 
- 0.00146 X9l R 2 = 0.9538 . 
All equations except 13.5 and 13.7 are homogeneous; 
i.e., al = O. All coefficients are significantly different 
from zero at the la-percent level, except for the co-
efficient of X 2 in equation 13.4. 
Since the objectives were given a value of 1 if con-
sidered most important and 7 if considered least impor-
tant, the derived equations and predictions should be 
interpreted accordingly. Furthermore, since the Y lj are 
ordinal values, no quantitative meaning should be placed 
on the predicted values-they should be used only in 
comparing (i.e., in ordering) the seven objectives. The 
predicted values will not necessarily fall within the 1-7 
range as the objectives were ranked; however, their or-
dinal character will still be preserved. For example, sup-
pose we are comparing the predicted rankings by coop-
eratives 1, 2 and 3 of objective 1, 
Y" Ij = al + l b1kXkj 
k 
and we obtain Y"u = -0.9, Y"I2 = 4.6 and Y"13 = 9.2 
as shown in table 10. We conclude that this objective 
is ranked higher by cooperative 2 than by cooperative 3 
and is _ ranked higher by cooperative 1 than by coopera-
tive 2. 
Table 10. Hypothetical example of results from equations 13.1 
and 13.2. 
Objective Cooperative j 
2 3 
"9'11 RII "9'12 R" "9'11 RI' 
I .......... ...1J.9 I 4.6 2 9.2 2 
2 .......... 6.8 2 3.1 I 0.6 
Judging by R2, it can be seen that most of the varia-
tion in the Ylj was explained .. In addition, Snedecor's 
F, for testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients 
estimated for a given equation are zero, was significant 
at the I-percent level for all equations; therefore, the 
null hypothesis must be rejected. 
Equation 13.1 indicates that, on the average, the 
nine cooperatives considered the first objective less im-
portant, ceteris paribus, the higher was handlers' buying 
price for producer milk. For a given price, on the other 
hand, this objective was ranked more important if the 
cooperative could handle a large portion of its total 
volume in its own processing plant. Distance from Eau 
Claire was also significantly correlated with YI , but was 
not used in the equation because of its influence on the 
federal-order class price and therefore on the bottler's 
buying price. Per-capita income in major metropolitan 
areas served by the cooperative was also significantly 
correlated with the cooperative's ranking of objective 
one. Equation 13.2 suggests that cooperatives with .'l. 
relatively large volume per bottler considered maintain-
ing a market for members' milk less important that did 
cooperatives with a small volume per handler. Table 9 
shows, however, that this objective was never ranked 
lower than third. 
Xo was related to the rankings of the third and 
fourth objectives in the same general way. Cooperatives 
having a low class I sales percentage generally considered 
these two objectives more important than did coopera-
tives having a high class I sales percentage. In addition, 
X 16 was positively related to Ya, and X 2 was negatively 
related to Y4 • If cooperatives with a low volume per 
handler located in an area where X16 is small had class 
I outlets for only a relatively small portion of their milk, 
it evidently was quite important for them to be assured 
of a market for all their milk and to maintain their class 
I outlets. 
No cooperative characteristics were significantly re-
lated to Y~. By using the two-tailed "t" test, the mean 
of Y 5 is found insignificantly different from 7 at the 1-
percent confidence level. 
Equation 13.6 indicates that, on the average, those 
cooperatives having more difficulty in securing recogni-
tion as the exclusive bargaining agent of their members 
consider negotiating for the value of services a rather 
important objective. Finally, equation 13.7 suggests that 
the more handlers with which a cooperative bargains 
and the more facilities it has for processing milk, the 
less important does the cooperative find it to maintain 
good relations with handlers. 
The simple correlation coefficients indicated that 
several other variables were significantly correlated with 
Y6 and Y7 • The influence of these other variables was, 
however, overshadowed by the variables actually used. 
These other variables correlated with Yo were X 2, 
and Xo, XlO and X5 (= cooperative's estimate of the val-
ue of services provided to handlers). The other variables 
correlated with Y7 were X 5, Xo, Xs, X lO, X 7 (= per-
centage of the cooperative's volume replaceable by 
handlers from other sources) and X 14 (= number of 
grade A producer members of the cooperative). 
Volume per handler, X 2, affects Xl, while X 5, Xo 
and X 10 influence Xs. We would expect that Xs will be 
related to the current ran kings of the last two objectives 
through its influence on other variables, including Xll' 
Also, it seems reasonable to expect that the more 
members a cooperative has, Xu, the more outlets, Xu, 
will be needed. Finally, dairy cooperatives whose entire 
volume is not replaceable from alternative sources may 
be in a better position to withhold milk and thus may 
want the assurance of an outlet for withheld milk so 
that this milk will not have to be dumped. Securing 
processing facilities is one way of getting this assurance. 
Each of these equations was estimated for the pur-
pose of making intercooperative comparisons; i.e., of 
predicting which cooperatives would rank a given ob-
jective relatively high or low compared with the rank-
ing given it by other cooperatives. Can these same equa-
tions be used for a different purpose: predicting which 
objectives are of greater or lesser importance than other 
objectives to a given cooperative? The nature of the 
problem is illustrated in table 10. Suppose that we are 
dealing with only two objectives and three cooperatives 
and that equations 13.1 and 13.2 yield the predictions 
in table 10. The second line shows that objective 2 is 
ranked higher by cooperative 3 than by cooperative 2 
and higher by cooperative 2 than by cooperative 1. To 
use these results to predict cooperative j's rankings, we 
proceed as follows. Since '£'11 < '£'21' cooperative 1 is 
predicted to rank objective 1 higher than it ranks ob-
jective 2. R11 is set equal to 1, R21 is set equal to 2. 
For the other cooperatives, j = 2,3, '£'lj > '£'2j. Hence, 
R lj = 2 > R 2j = 1. 
How well does R\j predict the actual rankings as-
signed by cooperative j? To answer this, compute the 
rank correlations between the predicted values Rij for 
each cooperative and the actual rankings of that coop-
erative. The results obtained from equations 13.1 to 13.7 
are presented in table 11. 
Table II. Comparison between actual and predicted rankings for 
each cooperative. 
Cooperative' 
Untied rankings 
pr&dicted 
incorrectly 
1 ...................... 2 
2 ...................... 2 
3 ...................... 3 
4 ...................... 2 
5 ...................... 0 
6 ...................... 2 
7 ...................... 2 
8 ...................... 2 
9 ...................... 5 
Spearman rllnk-
correlation 
coefficientb 
0.964 
0.904 
0.884 
0.964 
0.911 
0.955 
0.964 
0.904 
0.866 
• Cooperative numbers in this table correspond to those in table 9. 
b Correded for tied rankings. 
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The Y1j for each cooperative was predicted, and the 
seven objectives were ranked according to these pre-
dicted values. The computed rank-correlation coeffi-
cients between actual and predicted ranks were signif-
icant at the I-percent confidence level for every coopera-
tive. Although several ranks were predicted incorrectly, 
in no case did the predicted rank differ from the actual 
rank by more than 1. 
It was suggested that dairy bargaining cooperatives 
have a multidimensional or hierarchial goal system. If 
this is true, the cooperative's preference function for 
various bargaining strategies may be lexicographically 
ordered (25, pp. 232-234) - i.e., the cooperative will 
first seek to attain its most important objective. After 
being sure of attaining this, it will seek to attain its 
second most important objective, etc. Thus, if one could 
determine the importance of each of the several objec-
tives to a given cooperative, one may be able to deter-
mine also what bargaining strategy will be selected. 
For example, if the cooperative's major objective or 
aspiration is to maintain its past highest percentage of 
class I sales, it may be willing to sacrifice some of its 
premium to achieve this objective. Thus, its bargaining 
strategy may be quite different than if its major objec-
tive is to achieve the highest possible net return for 
members' milk. Further, each cooperative's rankings 
seem dependent on their peculiar characteristics and 
may thus be expected to change as these characteristics 
change. 
Equations 13.1 to 13.7 do provide a means by which 
one can determine the importance of various objectives 
to dairy cooperatives. 
There are problems associated with the use of regres-
sion to predict ranks, as was done here. (a) The Y ij 
are integer or integer plus half and 7 > Y ij > 1; the 
Y I] need not possess either of these properties. We used 
regression to predict ordering; its usual purpose is to 
predict or estimate magnitude. Thus, there is a ques-
tion as to the proper interpretation of t and F tests. 
(b) Rankings may be interdependent in two ways. (b.1) 
Each manager's rankings may be influenced by the rank-
ings assigned by other managers. (b.2) The rank a man-
ager assigns one objective may be affected by the rank 
he assigns other objectives or by his degree of success 
in attaining other objectives. We plan to discuss these 
problems and possible methods of handling them in a 
later report. 
MEANS OF SECURING BARGAINING GAINS 
Recognition 
Each cooperative manager was asked the following 
question: Of those processors and distributors with 
which you attempted to bargain in 1963, how many 
would and how many would not bargain with you? The 
answers to this question are recorded in table 12. 
It was hypothesized that, if the cooperative does not 
have a sufficient volume of milk, it will not be able to 
secure recognition from its handlers. Furthermore, it 
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Table 12. Ability of the dairy bargaining cooperatives studied to 
secure recognition as exclusive bargaining agent, 1963. 
Cooper~tive' 
Proportion of handlers 
who would bllrgainb 
.......................................... 99 
2 •................................. , ....... 100 
3 .......................................... 94 
4 .......................................... 100 
5 .......................................... 100 
b .......................................... 100 
7 .......................................... 93 
8 .......................................... 100 
9 .......................................... 33 
10 .......................................... 100 
• Cooper~tive numbers correspond to cooperative numbers listed 
in t~ble 9. . 
b Does not include out·of·st~te handlers. 
seems plausible to expect that there is a point beyond 
which a larger volume would have no effect on the 
cooperative's ability to secure recognition. 
To test these propositions, the following statistical 
model was proposed: 
(H) log Xli = a + f3/X21 + (i 
where Xli = the percentage of the local bottlers with 
which cooperative i attempted to bargain 
in 1963 who would bargain with the co-
operative, 
X 21 = average 1963 volume of bottlers with 
which cooperative i bargained in 1963 
(million pounds). 
If f3 < 0 this model yields an asymptote at loa_-
i.e., as X 2 approaches infinity, Xl approaches lOa. It 
also yields a point of inflection in the positive quadrant: 5 
at X 2 = -kf3/2. Since a value of Xl > 100 is meaning-
less, we expect a .;;;; 2. For -kf3/2 > Xz > 0, Xl in-
creases at an increasing rate, while for X2 > -kf3/2, Xl 
increases at a decreasing rate. 
The following estimates (with standard errors m 
parentheses) were derived by least squares from the 
data in tables 4 and 12: 
a = 2.02906 (0.00799) 
b = -0.57749 (0.02678) 
-kb/2 = 0.66486 (0.03084) 
R2 = 0.98309 
X 2dXl 
e = -- = -kb/X2 = 1.32972jX2 X l dX2 
where e = the percentage change in Xl associated with 
a I-percent change in X 2 • 
Using the one-tailed "t" test, the null hypothesis that 
a .;;;; 2 must be rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis that a > 2 at the 1-percent confidence level; 
• k == log.lO == 2.30259. 
band -kb/2 are significantly different from zero at the 
I-percent level. At various levels of X 2, we obtain the 
results in table 13 (where d = dXI/dX2 = the absolute 
change in Xl associated with a unit change in X2 ). 
We conclude that there is a positive relationship be-
tween volume per handler and dairy bargaining coopera-
tives' ability to secure recognition as the exclusive bar-
gaining agent for their members. Cooperatives may ben-
efit from economies of large-scale operations just as can 
processing firms. 
A simple regression of 1963 operating costs in cents 
per hundredweight (C) on total 1963 volume (V) in 
billions of pounds for six cooperatives yielded the fol-
lowing results (with standard errors of estimates in 
paren theses) : 
(15) C = 6.0059 - 0.9118 V R2 = 0.6883 
(0.5003) (0.3078) 
Although the coefficient on V is significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 5-percent confidence level, it 
takes a sizable increase in volume to have any appre-
ciable effect on C. 
There are also disadvantages to increasing volume-
i.e., (a) a tendency toward reduced support given to 
the cooperative's goals and (b) a possibility of an in-
crease in the cooperative's proportion of surplus milk. 
Increasing volume may mean increasing the number of 
members, which tends to be accompanied by more intra-
group conflict and by a reduction in group unity and 
cohesiveness. The end result may be a reduction in the 
amount of support given to the organization's goals. 
As a cooperative's volume increases with no cor-
responding increase in class I sales, the cooperative's 
volume of surplus milk relative to total volume will 
increase. Members' net price will be reduced. This may 
explain why increasing the size of the cooperative's pro-
curement area was not considered a more important ob-
jective by the cooperatives studied. 
Membership agreements 
All but one cooperative studied required members to 
sign a marketing agreement. The producer agrees to 
consign to the cooperative all milk produced on the farm 
(except that consumed by the farm family) and to al-
low the cooperative to market this milk together with 
that of all other members as it deems is in the best 
interest of all members. 
Table 13. Values of e and d computed from equation 14 for 
various values of X" 
Xl e d 
0.66 .. . .... 
· . · . 
. . . . .. 
· . · . 
.2.000 44.23 
2.00 ... ..... . ' ....... 
· . 
... 0.665 18.28 
5.00 . . .. . . ..... . . . . ... 
· . 
.0.266 5.01 
10.00 ... . . . . 
· . · . . . ......... 0.133 1.25 
15.00 .. ... . · . . . . . . ..... 
· . .0.089 0.57 
20.00 ....... 
· . · . 
... . . . 
· . 
... 0.067 0.33 
All agreements contained a duration-of-contract and 
an automatic-renewal clause. Some agreements stip-
ulated the amount of the membership fee and the deduc· 
tions or limits to the deductions to be taken from pro-
ducers' proceeds from the sale of milk. Four agreements 
contained a breach-of-contract clause and stipulated the 
amount to be levied against the faulty party. Several 
managers believed that a breach-of-contract clause and 
liquidated-damage clause were useless because they 
could not be enforced or were too difficult and time con-
suming to enforce. An important question then is what 
means does the cooperative employ to prevent a breach 
of contract. 
Several managers pointed out that it is more impor-
tant to be able to prevent such problems before they 
happen rather than to be able to penalize members. To 
do this, various services that are generally not available 
to nonmembers are provided to members (see table 8). 
Attempts to keep up membership loyalty are also made 
through distribution of cooperative earnings, personal 
contacts with members by fieldmen, group member-
ship meetings and various reports, including monthly 
newsletters and market information letters. 
Mergers and federations 
One way for a dairy cooperative to increase its vol-
ume is to sign up more producers in its procurement 
area-either independent producers or members of 
another cooperative-if it does not have IOO-percent 
control of these producers. There are limitations to this 
type of activity, however. First, it leads to poor relations 
between two or more cooperatives. Second, adding more 
members and therefore increasing volume without at the 
same time increasing the number of fluid-milk outlets 
will result in an increased percentage of surplus milk 
and in a lower net price to farmer-members. There was 
no evidence suggesting that any of the cooperatives 
studied attempt to secure the members of other coopera-
tives. Most of them do, however, attempt to sign up 
independent producers. 
Another method of increasing volume is through a 
merger. Since individual cooperatives lose their previous 
identity and autonomy in a merger by pooling member-
ship, volume, resources and outlets for milk, both of the 
limitations just mentioned can be eliminated through 
this method of increasing volume. There are, of course, 
problems that have to be worked out by all members to 
eliminate or reduce conflict within the new organization. 
For example, how many members shall each cooperative 
contribute to the board of directors? Who shall pay the 
burden of the previous cooperatives' debts? How shall 
milk be pooled (that is, how shall members of each coop-
erative involved in the merger share in the proceeds of 
the new cooperative) ? 
There have been a large number of dairy coopera-
tive mergers in recent years. Between 1958 and mid-
1964, five of the cooperatives studied had particiapted 
in various mergers which had involved 17 other coop-
eratives in total. 
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A cooperative federation, in contrast to a merger, 
involves a uniting of two or more cooperatives by cov-
enant so that each of the participating cooperatives re-
tains its local autonomy and identity. Thus, the prob-
lems of consolidating two or more cooperatives into one 
are eliminated. Competition among member coopera-
tives is still possible even though one of the objectives 
of a federation is to coordinate the marketing activity 
of all cooperatives in the group. Further, maintaining 
"esprit de corps" among member cooperatives may be-
come difficult. A decision desirable from the long-run 
standpoint of all farmers involved in the federation may 
not be desirable to the members of one individual coop-
erative. Pooling arrangements are a problem to be 
worked out by the individual cooperatives in the federa-
tion. 
Two different types of federations may be formed. 
One is the regional federation, which is exemplified by: 
(a) United Dairy Producers Cooperative, organized in 
1960, consisting of the Des Moines, Cedar Rapids, Wa-
teroo and Moline cooperatives; (b) Central Southwest 
Regional Stock Cooperative, organized in 1964, consist-
ing of the Omaha cooperative, the Denver Milk Pro-
ducers Association, the Southwest Milk Producers As-
sociation in Wichita, the Central West Texas Milk Pro-
ducers Association in Abilene and the Dairy Farmers 
Cooperative Association in Albuquerque; and (c) the 
Great Lakes Milk Marketing Federation, organized in 
1960, consisting of the Detroit cooperative, Northwest 
Cooperative Sales in Toledo, the Cleveland Milk Pro-
ducers Federation, the Dairymen's Cooperative Sales 
Association in Pittsburgh, the Akron Milk Producers 
Association and the Wayne Cooperative Milk Producers 
in Fort Wayne. 
Federations such as these perform several valuable 
functions. (a) They can eliminate duplication of routes 
and capitalize on economies of scale in farm-to-market 
milk hauling when procurement areas overlap. (b) They 
may operate a centralized sales agency to coordinate 
off-the-market sales. (c) They can work to establish 
reasonable or proper price relationships between mar-
kets regulated by separate federal orders. (d) They may 
bargain jointly with 10 to 15 stores of a national chain 
to replace a situation where each cooperative bargains 
with two or three stores of that chain. (e) The federa-
tion can coordinate the movement of surplus milk be-
tween markets served by member cooperatives. (f) A 
federation can undertake joint bargaining efforts to re-
place the individual bargaining efforts of individual 
member cooperatives. The result of successful perform-
ance of these functions is to increase the bargaining ef-
fectiveness of all cooperatives in the organization. 
Additional advantages of federations mentioned by 
managers were: (a) Federation allows the personnel of 
one cooperative to become better acquainted with the 
people and problems of other cooperatives. (b) It allows 
the trading of valuable information concerning the op-
erations in nearby markets and the influence of these op-
erations on one's own market and bargaining ability. 
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(c) It allows the exchange of valuable infonnation on 
conditions in the industry in general. (d) It eliminates 
the problem of acquiring additional surplus milk as a 
result of a merger. 
The disadvantage mentioned by all managers in-
volved in federations was the extreme difficulty of rec-
onciling differences of opinion among members of dif-
ferent cooperatives in the federation. Personal problems 
between officials of different cooperatives in the federa-
tion are difficult to avoid and may become a threat to 
the effectiveness of the federation. 
A second type of federated activity is exemplified by 
superpools-strictly joint-bargaining efforts between a 
number of local cooperatives in which the milk supply 
of all cooperatives is pooled, and the negotiated pre-
mium money is distributed to the members of these 
cooperatives on the basis of some predetermined pooling 
system. One superpool is in operation in the Chicago 
market in which the Pure Milk Association is a member 
along with 23 other cooperatives. A second superpool 
is in operation in southern Michigan in which the Mich-
igan Milk Producers Association is a member along with 
eight other cooperatives. The characteristics and prob-
lems of these two federations are essentially the same as 
those of the three previously discussed. The difference is 
primarily in the emphasis placed on joint bargaining 
and in the area covered. 
Federations do not increase the volume of any coop-
erative involved. Nevertheless, they allow joint control 
over a larger volume of milk than that of anyone coop-
erative in the federation. For example, since all coopera-
tives in the Chicago and Detroit area bargain jointly 
with bottlers, if either of these groups of cooperatives 
decided to withhold milk from a bottler, this bottler 
would have to go outside the local market to get an 
alternative supply of milk unless local independent pro-
ducers could provide enough milk to meet his needs. 
This is presumably more important for superpools than 
for federations placing less emphasis on joint bargaining. 
Baumol (3) has argued, as mentioned earlier, that 
the prisoners' dilemma game is involved in the logic 
underlying government control in a democratic society. 
Cooperative mergers and federations may be rationalized 
on the same grounds or may be viewed as efforts to 
convert a prisoners' dilemma game or a noncooperative 
game into a cooperative game. 
Type I Bargaining Power 
One of the reasons that dairy bargaining coopera-
tives are able to negotiate a price for members' milk in 
excess of the federal-order minimum price is that they 
offer various services to milk dealers in return. Table 14 
contains a list of the services offered to dealers by each 
cooperative studied. 
Most managers believed that the cooperative's ability 
to full-supply bottlers was the most important service 
they could offer. In full-supplying a bottler, the coop-
erative agrees to provide exactly that quantity of milk 
needed by the handler. If assured of a full supply of 
Table 14. Services offered boHlers by dairy bargaining cooperatives studied. 
Service offered 
Producer check writing ................... X 
Bulk handling of milk .................... X 
Maintoining high quality milk ............. X 
Product stendardizotion ................. . 
Full-supply contracts ..................... X 
Wash bottlers tanks ..................... . 
Diversion of surplus milk to: 
Own processing plant ................ X 
Other processing plants ............. . 
Pick up milk of producers supplying 
plants acquired by bottlers .......... . 
VALUE OF SERVICES OFFEREDb 
(cents per hundredweight) ............... 34 
2 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
20 
4 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Cooperative' 
5 b 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X 
X X 
29 
7 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
7 
8 
x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
9 
X 
X 
X 
X 
30 
10 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
10 
• Cooperative numbers correspond to the cooperative numbers shown in table 9. 
b Estimated by the respective cooperotive managers. 
milk, the bottler processing milk only 5 days per week 
does not have to incur the costs of handling and storing 
milk received from producers during the remainder of 
the week. Also the bottler need not worry about failing 
to meet the demand for his product each day since day-
to-day variations in his milk supply are eliminated. The 
cooperative agrees to find an outlet for any excess milk 
and to find an extra supply if the bottlers' demands can-
not be met with member milk. All cooperatives studied 
indicated that they full-supply bottlers; however, there 
were no legal instruments used in connection with this 
service. 
Each manager's estimate of the value to bottlers of 
the services provided by his cooperative is shown in table 
14. Five of the cooperatives negotiate a premium on class 
I milk equal to the reported value of the services they 
provide. 
If the price a bottler pays the local cooperative ex-
ceeds that which he would have to pay to get milk from 
an alternative source, we may take this excess to rep-
resent the value to bottlers of obtaining milk from the 
local cooperative. 
To determine the extent of this excess for each coop-
erative studied, we take Eau Claire, Wisconsin, to be 
the region of heavy surplus production and the alterna-
tive source of milk for the bottlers of these cooperatives. 
On deducting, from the average annual bottlers' buying 
price for fluid milk in a given market, (a) the average 
annual bottlers' buying price for fluid milk in Eau 
Claire and (b) the cost of transporting milk from Eall 
Claire to the given market, we arrive at the data pre-
sented in table 15.6 These data, then, are taken to rep-
resent an estimate of the value to bottlers of securing 
milk from the local cooperative in preference to securing 
milk from Eau Claire sources. 
The data in table 15 suggest that most of the coop-
eratives studied were adequately paid for services ren-
• The transportation cost function presented by Butz (6) was used. 
dered bottlers. In only one case was the calculated value 
to bottlers of securing milk from the local cooperative 
lower than the cooperative's estimate of the value of 
services offered. For one cooperative, the value recorded 
in table 15 exceeded the cooperative's estimate of the 
value of services provided by more than 20 cents per 
hundredweight. 
Values similar to those in table 15 were computed 
for two markets in the Michigan upper peninsula and 
for three markets in southern Michigan. These com-
putations yielded 45 cents for Kalamazoo, 38 cents for 
Muskegon, 34 cents for Traverse City, 10 cents for Mar-
quette and 12 cents for Sault Ste. Marie. One man-
ager's explanation for the lower values in the Michigan 
upper peninsula markets was that these two markets are 
closer to the alternative sources of milk than are the 
southern Michigan markets and, therefore, that bottlers' 
buying prices in the Michigan upper peninsula markets 
must be in close alignment with buying prices in Wis-
consin markets. This, then, suggests that the more dis-
tant a market is from the surplus-production region the 
Table 15. Estimated average annual value to bottlers of obtaining 
milk from the local cooperative, 1963." 
Market Cents per hundredweight 
Burlington ., ................................... 23.0 
Wllterloo ...................................... 18.5 
Cedar Rapids .................................. 12.5 
Des Moines .................................... 27.0 
Omaha ........................................ 31.0 
Moline ..................... " .......... , . " .... 13.0 
Mason City .................................... 24.5 
Sioux City ...................................... 4b.0 
Chicago ....................................... 22.0 
Detroit ..•.................................... .42.0 
• Source: U. S. Dept. Agr. Federal milk order mllrket statistics, 
annual summery for 1963. U. S. Dept. Agr. Stat. Bul. 345. 1964. 
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higher will be the value of obtaining milk from the local 
cooperative as estimated in table 15. 
There would seem to be several other reasons for 
such wide differentials. Sanitary requirements for milk 
production are not universally the same, and a price ad-
justment may be necessary in some markets to reflect 
the different costs associated with meeting these different 
sanitary requirements. The transportation cost function 
used in this analysis is an average. Bottlers in some mar-
kets may be willing to pay a higher price for the priv-
ilege of securing locally produced milk for local con-
sumption-presumably for advertising purposes. Some 
bottlers may be willing to pay a higher price for locally 
produced milk, because a local cooperative is a more 
dependable source of supply than others in case of bad 
weather. Some cooperatives have such a large volume 
that their milk could not be replaced from alternative 
sources either at the same or at a lower price. 
Milk bottlers are required to pay members of the 
cooperative (and nonmembers as well) a price at least 
as high as the federal-order minimum price. However, 
if the cooperative considers this minimum price too low, 
it may present evidence in a federal-order hearing, jus-
tifying its claim for a higher minimum price. In the 
same hearing, bottlers may present evidence showing 
why the cooperative's claim is unjustified. The Office of 
the Secretary of Agriculture weighs the evidence and 
reaches a decision, much the same as does an arbitrator 
in labor disputes. 
Hence, the cooperative may have an opportunity in 
the hearing to obtain a price which will cover the value 
of services provided bottlers; i.e., bargaining may take 
place in the federal-order hearing in the presence of a 
third party rather than around the baragining table. If 
the cooperative is successful in obtaining such a price, 
one may expect the excess of the average annual federal-
order minimum class I price in the market over (a) the 
average annual bottlers' buying price for fluid milk in 
Eau Claire and (b) the cost of transporting milk from 
Eau Claire to the given market to be at least as large 
as this cooperative's estimate of the value of services 
provided bottlers. Or equivalently, one may expect the 
values recorded in table 15, less the negotiated premium 
on class I milk, to be at least as large as the value of 
services provided. This was true for five of the markets 
listed in table 15. 
The following statistical model was estimated: 
(16) X 3i = al + !34X 4i + !35X 5i + !36X 6i 
+ !3rX 1i + €i 
where X 3i = estimated 1963 average annual value to 
cooperative i's bottlers of obtaining milk 
from cooperative i (cents per hundred-
weight), from table 15, 
646 
X 41 = 1, if for cooperative i, X 31 less the nego-
tiated premium on class I milk equalled 
or exceeded the value of services pro-
vided bottlers in 1963 in table 14, 
= 0 otherwise, 
x:)! = cooperative !'s estimate of the value of 
services provided bottlers (cents per hun-
dredweight) , 
X Si = cooperative i's distance from Eau Claire, 
Wisconsin, 
Xn = percentage of cooperative i's volume re-
placeable from alternative sources and 
(i = an independently and normally distrib-
uted random variable with mean zero 
and variance (1'2. 
Least-squares estimates of the parameters of equa-
tion 16 yielded values for at and br which were insignif-
icantly different from zero at the 20-percent confidence 
level. Consequently, the parameters were reestimated 
on the assumption that al = !31 = O. The following 
estimates, all significantly different from zero at the 5-
percent level, were obtained (standard errors of the 
estimates are shown in parentheses following each esti-
mate) : 
b4 = 10.9826 (2.3394) 
br. = 0.5572 (0.1688) 
b6 = 0.0348 (0.0105) 
R2 = 0.9844 
Multiplying each b j (j = 4, 5, 6) and its standard 
error by the ratio of the standard error of X j to the 
standard error of Xs yields estimates of bjs independent 
of the units of measurement, which indicate the relative 
importance of one independent variable over the other 
two in the determination of X3.7 These estimates are: 
b,s = 0.5196 (0.1107) 
bos = 0.5162 (0.1564) 
bog = 0.3852 (0.1160) 
Snedecor's F for testing the hypothesis that b4s = 
b5 • = bGS = 0.5196 and that b4s = br." = bas = 0.3852 
is 3.31 and 3.46, respectively. Thus, both hypotheses 
must be accepted at the 5-percent confidence level, and 
we conclude that the three factors are of approximately 
equal importance in the determination of Xa. 
Differences in the elasticity of demand for fluid milk 
in the various markets may account for some of the var-
iation in the results recorded in table 15. If the federal-
order minimum price for class I milk adequately re-
flects the difference in milk-production costs between the 
several markets, the values in table 15 may be expected 
to be higher for cooperatives in markets where the de-
mand for producer milk for fluid use is less elastic. 
Demand functions were estimated for those markets 
in table 15 for which time-series data were available by 
using the statistical model, 
(17) Qlt = ai + !3iPit + ¥IY lt + £It 
where PIt = retail price of whole milk in market i and 
year t in cents per paper quart for the 
, Such estimates are called "beta" or "standardized" regression co-
efficients. 
most common grade sold out of stores 
(33) , 
QIt = per-capita consumption of fluid milk and 
fluid-milk products in market i and year t 
in pounds of 3.5-percent producer milk 
equivalent (32, 33), 
Y1t = per-capita income in market i and year 
t in dollars (26) and 
(It = a normally and independently distributed 
random error with mean zero and var-
iance uI 
Demand functions were estimated with consump-
tion as the dependent variable on the assumption that 
retail price and per-capita income are predetermined 
and that errors in the retail demand equation are in-
dependent of errors in the retail supply equation for 
each market. It was ass.umed that the retail price per 
quart for whole milk adequately reflects the retail value 
of all fluid milk products. Statistics obtained from the 
indicated regressions are recorded in table 16. Since 
only the b's for Chicago and Detroit are significantly 
different from zero at the 5-percent level, only the first 
two equations in table 16 will be used in the following 
analysis. 
It is assumed that a lO-percent retail markup for 
fluid milk and fluid-milk products is typical (see 5, p. 
44; 17). The share of the market for a typical firm is 
assumed equal to the ratio of total producer milk used 
for class I purposes per regulated bottler in the federal 
order to the per-capita consumption of all fluid-milk 
products (pounds of 3.5-percent producer milk equiv-
alent) . 
The 1963 share of the market so calculated for a 
typical Chicago bottler was 103,227 persons and, for a 
typical southern Michigan bottler, 46,015 persons 
(31,33). On the basis of these assumptions, we get the 
following fluid-milk demand functions facing typical 
bottlers in the two markets: 
Table 16. Selected statistics from regression estimates of demand 
for fluid milk and fluid-milk products.· 
Market 
al bi Ci R2 db 
Chicago .......... 573.8284 -7.6043 -0.0195 0.8940 1.00 
(29.0762) (2.2923) (0.0212) 
Detroit ........ " .590.3142 -9.6747 -0.0071 0.8914 1.26 
(45.8466) (1.8713) (0.0301 ) 
Quod Cities ...... .450.0986 -0.2966 -0.0505 0.5321 1.71 
(65.2552) (5.7674) (0.0490) 
Sioux City ........ 553.4959 -4.3442 -0.0675 0.7058 1.74 
(67.2360) (4.6732) (0.0353) 
Omaha .......... .431.8461 -1.6435 -0.0281 0.4024 2.14 
(73.1027) (5.3460) (0.0389) 
• Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are shown in paren-
theses. 
b The Durbin-Wlltson "d" statistic. Although the Durbin-Watson 
tables do not extend below 15 observations, extrapolation indicates 
that a "d" as low as 1.00 or 1.26 for 10 observations i's an incon-
clusive test for positive autocorrelation. 
(18) QI = 59,234,584 - 872,245.56 Pwl - 2012.9 
Y i for i = Chicago, 
(19) QI = 27,163,308 - 494,641.11 PWi - 326.7 
YI for i = Detroit, 
where Pwi = 0.9 PI = wholesale price per quart. Eval-
uating these two equations at 1963 levels of prices and 
incomes yields price elasticities of demand of -0.75 for 
Detroit and -0.56 for Chicago. 
This implies that the typical bottler in Chicago and 
Detroit sells all his milk to retail outlets. If all his milk 
is sold directly to homes, his demand curve would be 
the retail demand function from which equation 18 or 
19 was derived. The elasticity of demand at the 1963 
price and consumer income would be unchanged for 
each market since we have assumed a constant percent-
age retail markup. Bottlers will ordinarily sell milk 
directly to homes and to retail outlets. We assume that 
the cost of delivering milk to homes is equal to the re-
tail markup; thus, only one demand curve need be 
shown for each handler. 
To derive the demand curve for class I milk facing 
the cooperatives, the spread between wholesale and 
cooperative price must be deducted from Pwi • Assuming 
this spread to be 12.85 cents per quart for the typical 
Chicago bottler and 12.35 cents per quart for the typ-
ical Detroit bottler (31, 33) and constant, the elasticity 
of derived demand for class I milk at the 1963 level of 
per-capita income and cooperative price is -0.23 for 
the Chicago cooperative and -0.35 for the Detroit coop-
erative. Analogous elasticities in Quad Cities, Omaha 
and Sioux City may be taken to be zero since the b's 
for these markets were insignificantly different from 
zero. 
Since these cooperatives are operating on the inelas-
tic portions of their respective demand curves for Class 
I milk, they could increase their net profits (if coopera-
tive marginal costs are not negative) by selling a lower 
total volume of class I milk for a higher price to their 
bottlers. These cooperatives could dump some milk and 
still secure for members a higher net return for milk 
than members are presently getting. Presumably, how-
ever, there would be outlets other than class I available 
for this extra milk. 
Although not every bottler has facilities for process-
ing surplus milk, we will assume for illustrative purposes 
that the typical bottler in Chicago and Detroit does 
have such facilities. If so, the cooperative may find it 
profitable to encourage this bottler to use less class I 
milk and more surplus milk. This can be shown by an 
application of the price discrimination model. 
Expressing in terms of price the 1963 demand func-
tions derived from equations 18 and 19, we obtain 
and 
(20) Pu = 48.69 - 0.00000115 Qli for i = 
Chicago 
(21) P lI = 40.98 - 0.00000202 QlI for i = 
Detroit 
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where Pli = fann price of class I milk on a per-quart 
basis and Qu = pounds of class I milk. Also, if we 
take the elasticity of derived demand for surplus milk 
to be -0.6 in both markets (5), the farm price of surplus 
milk on a per-quart basis in 1963 to be 6.7 cents in 
both markets-the average 1963 federal-order minimum 
price for milk used for manufacturing purposes (31) 
converted to a per-quart basis-and the quantity of sur-
plus milk purchased by the typical Chicago bottler in 
1963 to be 51,380,900 pounds and by the typical Detroit 
bottler in 1963 to be 10,830,000 pounds-the quantity 
of surplus milk purchased by regulated bottlers in the 
respective federal-order markets per regulated handler, 
see (31) -the following derived demand functions for 
surplus milk are obtained: 
(22) P21 = 17.87 - 0.00000021 Q2i for i = 
Chicago 
(23) P2i = 17.87 - 0.00000103 Q21 for i = 
Detroit 
where P21 = farm price of surplus milk on a per-quart 
basis and Q21 = pounds of surplus milk.s Finally, we 
assume the typical bottler in Chicago purchased 84,826,-
600 total pounds of milk and the typical bottler in De-
troit purchased 25,922,800 total pounds of milk in 19~3 
(total producer milk purchased by regulated bottlers m 
the two markets per regulated bottler, see 31). 
Under these conditions, it can be verified by sub-
stitution into the first- and second-order conditions of 
the price discrimination model that cooperative profits 
would have been maximized if Qll = 24,797,794 and 
Q21 = 60,028,806 for i = Chicago and QlI = 12,542,-
623 and Q21 = 13,380,177 for i = Detroit. In compar-
ison with profits made from the sale of class I milk at 
the 1963 bottlers' buying price for class I milk and the 
sale of surplus milk at the 1963 federal-order minimum 
price for surplus milk, the Chicago cooperative's profits 
would have been 0.89 cents per quart higher, and the 
Detroit cooperative's profits would have been 0.33 cents 
per quart higher. Thus, both cooperatives would have 
increased their profits had they been able to raise class 
I price and lower class II price. The class I utilization 
percentage for the typical Chica?o bottler at the profit-
maximization solution is approxunately 30 percent; the 
corresponding figure for the typical Detroit bottler is 50 
percent. Actual 1963 class I utilization ~atios w~re about 
40 percent in Chicago and 60 percent In DetrOIt. 
Since the typical bottler in Chicago and Detroit 
seems to be operating on the inelastic portion of his de-
mand curve he will be able to increase his net profits 
by operatin~ at a lower volume and selling this volume 
for a higher price. This may help to explain why bottle.rs 
tolerate superpool operations in Chicago. and DetrOlt. 
The analysis outlined here could be refmed by deter-
mining the actual cost functions o.f milk bottlers a?d 
cooperatives and the demand functIOn for surplus mdk 
• That is. we are assuming that we know. the price. and quantity !,ssociated 
with a point On the linear demand functIon at whIch the elastICIty of de-
mand equals -0.6. 
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in each market. The elasticity of derived demand of -0.6 
for surplus milk is an average of Brandow's estimates of 
elasticity of farm level demand for milk for use in cheese 
and butter. In individual markets, demand would be 
more elastic; i.e., less than -0.6. The assumption of a 
more elastic demand for class II milk would yield dif-
ferent derived demand functions for class II milk. The 
optimal solutions from the price discrimination model 
would then call for larger Q21 and smaller Qll than in 
the solutions given. 
Type II Bargaining Power 
Attitude toward striking 
Most of the cooperatives studied showed little inter-
est in calling a milk strike under 1963-64 conditions. 
Seven of the 10 managers stated that they would not 
call a milk strike under 1963-64 conditions to obtain a 
higher price for milk. Three of these seven implied that 
they would withhold milk from bottlers only if one or 
more bottlers became so antagonistic toward the coop-
erative that the cooperative preferred not to conduct 
any business wth them. The principal reason given by 
these seven managers was the presence of too much sur-
plus milk available to bottlers which .would replace any 
milk withheld by the local cooperatIVe. The managers 
expressed fear that their cooperative would permanent-
ly lose an outlet for its milk. 
Other reasons given for not calling a milk strike 
were: (a) The cooperative and handlers have already 
agreed upon a reasonable p;ice through th: federal o~­
der. (b) A strike could bnng on a laWSUIt. (c) It IS 
against the cooperative's policy to call a milk strike. 
All seven cooperatives expressing reluctance at call-
ing a milk strike under 1963-64 conditions were relative-
ly small. The total volume of eac~ c?uld ~asily .be re-
placed by alternative sources of mllk In. Wlsconslll and 
Minnesota. Two of the three cooperatives who would 
call a milk strike (Chicago and Detroit) on the other 
hand had volumes in 1963 of nearly 3 billion pounds-
a voiume which could not easily be replaced. Finally, 
the three cooperatives who would call a milk strike un-
der 1963-64 conditions had an outlet for much Or aU 
of their milk supply in their own processing plants should 
they decide to withhold milk. The other seven coopera-
tives had no processing facilities or had facilities for 
handling only a small part of the cooperatives' total milk 
supply. 
Two of the three cooperative managers indicating 
that they would call a milk strike under 1963-~4 condi-
tions stated that they would prefer to withhold milk 
from one or a few of their bottlers rather than from all 
bottlers. One of the reasons for this preference was that 
the cooperative could then use the whipsaw technique 
in negotiations. Gains acquired from this one bottler or 
small group could be used as leverage in negotiations 
with other bottlers. Further, there was some reluctance 
to withhold milk from all bottlers because it would have 
to be diverted to lower-valued uses. (It was universally 
thought that members would not consent to dumping 
milk.) The third manager, however, indicated a prefer-
ence for withholding milk from all bottlers since it 
would be much more difficult for all bottlers to find 
an alternative source of milk than it would be for one. 
Two important factors, then, determining whether 
or not a cooperative will strike are (a) where the alter-
native sources of milk are located, the cost to handlers 
of securing this milk and the probability that the coop-
erative's handlers wiII be able to secure sufficient milk 
from these sources to replace the milk being withheld 
and (b) what the cooperative would do with the milk. 
Other factors suggested by the managers included (c) 
whether the handler is a small independent firm or a 
national chain, (d) whether the resulting public reac-
tion, if any, would be favorable or unfavorable to the 
cooperative, possibility of pressure from newspaper ed-
itorials and city officials, and what legal repercussions 
are likely to result, (e) whether the economic conditions 
justify the cooperative's demand and (f) whether mem-
bers will back the strike attempt. In determining how 
long the cooperative would withhold milk, the managers 
felt that they would have to consider the expected pub-
lic and legislative reaction, expectations of success or 
failure, availability of alternative sources of milk and 
member support. 
Cost of a strike 
Member support depends on the expected loss and 
the length of time necessary to recover the strike losses. 
The losses accompanying a strike and the time necessary 
to recover these losses will vary from case to case. 
Let us assume a cooperative located in a federal-or-
der market to have an annual volume of 525 million 
pounds of 3.5-percent grade A milk and that 
(a) its average weekly June volume is 11,250,000 
pounds of 3.5-percent milk, 
(b) its June class I utilization percentage is 65, 
(c) the June federal-order prices are $3.96 and 
$3.02 per hundredweight for 3.5-percent class 
I and II milk and 
(d) the seasonal variation in total volume and class 
I volume is the same as the 1962-63 seasonal 
variation in the Des Moines federal-order mar-
ket (31). 
Cooperative gross income in June would then be $408,-
487.50 per week. 
If this cooperative decided to call a milk strike on 
all its handlers and the strike lasted throughout the first 
week in June and if it could find an alternative outlet 
for only 10 percent of its class I milk at a net price of 
$3.96 per hundredweight, the remaining portion of its 
sales going into alternative class II outlets at $3.02 per 
hundredweight, the cooperative's gross income in the 
first week of June would be reduced by $61,868. The 
cooperative would have recovered this amount by the 
end of the 16th week after the strike ended if a premium 
of 5 cents per hundredweight on class I milk over the 
federal-order class I price were negotiated and by the 
end of the 25th week if only a 3-cent premium on class 
I milk were negotiated. If the strike lasted 2 weeks, 29 
weeks would be required to recover the lost gross income 
if a 5-cent premium were negotiated and 49 weeks if a 
3-cent premium were negotiated. 
As a result of a I-week strike, assume that 10 per-
cent of the cooperative's class I sales have been per-
manently lost and that this milk must go to class II out-
lets. Under these conditions, the cooperative would have 
had to negotiate a premium of 10.4 cents per hundred-
weight during June on class I milk to maintain the week-
ly gross income of $408,487. Depending on the class 
prices in future months, this premium may, of course, 
be insufficient to maintain this weekly income. Further-
more, it will not allow the cooperative to recover any 
of the income lost during the strike. 
Assume that the cooperative also owns a butter-
powder processing plant with a weekly capacity of 8,-
750,000 pounds of 3.5-percent milk. The average total 
cost function per hundredweight of milk for this plant 
is assumed to be equal to 72 - 0.3 X, where X = 
percentage of capacity, and the plant produces 1.125 
pounds of butter per pound of butterfat and 8.6 pounds 
of nonfat dry milk per hundredweight of skimmilk. 
Combining these assumptions, the total returns to be 
distributed to members for the first week in June are 
$412,836. 
If this cooperative called a milk strike and could 
find an alternative outlet for only 10 percent of its class 
I sales at a price of $3.96, the remaining volume going 
to its processing plant and to other class II outlets, total 
cooperative returns to be distributed to members for the 
first week in June would be $370,726. 
The strike in this case would thus result in a reduc-
tion in the cooperative's net income per week of $42,111. 
The cooperative would have recovered the $42,111 by 
the end of the 12th week if a 5-cent premium on class 
I milk were negotiated and by the end of the 17th week 
if only a 3-cent premium on class I milk were negotiated. 
If the strike lasted 2 weeks, 20 weeks would be required 
to recover the lost net income if a 5-cent premium were 
negotiated and 34 weeks if a 3-cent premium were 
negotiated. 
These results emphasize the possible cost of a strike 
to producer-members under various conditions. The cost 
is likely to be lower for members of a cooperative that 
has its own processing facilities. 
These losses are substantial and may not be recovered 
before 6 months have elapsed, even if the cooperative 
is successful in negotiating a premium with handlers. 
If members lack the financial resources to withstand 
such losses, they are not likely to support the strike ef-
fort; thus, the cooperative might never recover the 
losses. 
legislation 
All managers interviewed indicated that they partic-
ipated in federal-order hearings. Various objectives were 
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sought in these hearings, depending on the local situa-
tion. Seeking a higher class I price was the most fre-
quently mentioned objective. The reason for this is 
obvious-to increase member returns. Several managers 
also sought a higher class II price. Expansion of market 
area was the second most common objective mentioned. 
Other legislative or regulatory measures were also 
sought by these cooperatives. For example, the Omaha 
cooperative was active in and takes major credit for the 
grade A milk law in Nebraska. In addition, most of the 
cooperatives interviewed indicated that they work with 
the state dairy associations and with the American Dairy 
Association. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
One of the results of this study suggests a procedure 
for predicting how a cooperative, or any other economic 
agent, will rank a series of objectives on the basis of its 
peculiar characteristics and environment. How success-
ful the procedure is can only be determined by further 
study. Thus, it would be desirable to test the validity 
of the equations derived in this study and to repeat the 
analysis on a larger and more representative sample. 
This may be a fruitful area for interdisciplinary research 
since one's ranking of objectives is likely to be affected 
by one's psychological and sociological traits. 
More detailed information on objectives, the pro-
cedure by which they will be sought and the level of 
attainment which would be satisfactory before another 
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objective is sought would contribute to our understand-
ing of cooperative behavior. 
In addition, such a study may contribute to a larger 
study designed to evaluate the results of changes in struc-
ture and conduct in a given industry. For example, equa-
tions, such as those derived in this study to predict the 
cooperatives' rankings of its objectives, may be incor-
porated into a submodel depicting the interrelationships 
between decisions made by several dairy cooperatives. 
Such a model would also include demand and supply 
functions for each market and would allow for inter-
market shipments of milk. Finally, the model may in-
clude a bargaining submodel in which negotiated prices 
are determined subject to the existing institutional con-
straints. 
Once the over-all model is developed, the perform-
ance of this sector of the dairy industry under various 
changes in structural and conduct variables could be 
predicted by simulation, and the resulting performance 
could be compared with some normative model. Finally, 
since the cooperatives' objectives would be determined 
in part by the resulting performance, such a model 
would provide some basis for determining the extent to 
which performance affects conduct and structure. 
Since a dairy cooperative's bargaining ability will 
undoubtedly be influenced by milk handlers' aspirations, 
it would be desirable to make a study of milk handlers 
similar to the study reported here. 
It appears worthwhile to try to apply game theoretic 
concepts to problems of intercooperative relationships. 
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